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PRIVACY AS SAFETY 
Michael Froomkin* & Zak Colangelo** 
Abstract: The idea that privacy makes you safer is unjustly neglected: public officials 
emphasize the dangers of privacy while contemporary privacy theorists acknowledge that 
privacy may have safety implications but hardly dwell on the point. We argue that this lack of 
emphasis is a substantive and strategic error and seek to rectify it. This refocusing is 
particularly timely given the proliferation of new and invasive technologies for the home and 
for consumer use more generally, not to mention surveillance technologies such as so-called 
smart cities. 
Indeed, we argue—perhaps for the first time in modern conversations about privacy—that 
in many cases privacy is safety, and that, in practice, United States law already recognizes this 
fact. Although the connection rarely figures in contemporary conversations about privacy, the 
relationship is implicitly recognized in a substantial but diverse body of U.S. law that protects 
privacy as a direct means of protecting safety. As evidence we offer a survey of the ways in 
which U.S. law already recognizes that privacy is safety, or at least that privacy enhances 
safety. Following modern reformulations of Alan Westin’s four zones of privacy, we explore 
the safety-enhancing privacy protections within the personal, intimate, semi-private, and 
public zones of life, and find examples in each zone, although cases in which privacy protects 
physical safety seem particularly frequent. We close by noting that new technologies such as 
the Internet of Things and connected cars create privacy gaps that can endanger their users’ 
safety, suggesting the need for new safety-enhancing privacy rules in these areas. 
By emphasizing the deep connection between privacy and safety, we seek to lay a 
foundation for planned future work arguing that U.S. administrative agencies with a safety 
mission should make privacy protection one of their goals. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In this Article we seek to forefront a longstanding justification for 
privacy: that it makes you safer. We do so for three reasons. 
First, privacy is too often attacked on the grounds that it grants terrorists 
and criminals the ability to put people in harm’s way.1 We do not, in this 
                                                   
1. The law-enforcement argument is exemplified by the testimony of an FBI representative 
to  Congress:  
In order to better protect this nation and its people from harm, we need to be able to access 
electronic information . . . [or else] we may not be able to root out the child predators hiding in 
the shadows of the Internet, or find and arrest violent criminals who are targeting our 
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Article, analyze the strength of claims that privacy may be harmful. 
Rather, we seek to balance the discussion by pointing out that privacy is 
a two-way street, in that it also protects people from many dangers, and 
that (primarily U.S.) law and official practices already reflect this 
understanding in a variety of ways. We believe that this reminder is 
particularly timely given the proliferation of new and invasive 
technologies for the home and for consumer use more generally, not to 
mention surveillance technologies such as so-called smart cities.2 
                                                   
neighborhoods. We may not be able to identify and stop terrorists who are using social media to 
recruit, plan, and execute an attack in our country. We may not be able to recover critical 
information from a device that belongs to a victim who cannot provide us with the password, 
especially when time is of the essence. 
Statement Before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcomm. on Oversight and 
Investigation, 114th Cong. (2016) (statement of Amy Hess, Executive Assistant Director, Science 
and  Technology  Branch  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation),  https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/
deciphering-the-debate-over-encryption [https://perma.cc/3YWB-NJVB]; see also STEWART BAKER, 
SKATING ON STILTS (2010). 
Other arguments rest on the need to prevent the use of information communication technologies to 
silence or harm women and other vulnerable groups. See DANIELLE K. CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN 
CYBERSPACE (2014); Danielle K. Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break: Denying 
Bad Samaritans Section 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401 (2017); Mary A. Franks, Sexual 
Harassment 2.0, 71 MD. L. REV. 655 (2012) (proposing liability on intermediaries so they will 
identify or discipline bad actors); Erin Peebles, Cyberbullying: Hiding Behind the Screen, 19(10) 
PEDIATRICS & CHILD HEALTH 527 (2014) 
Justice Scalia, himself at times a defender of privacy, summed up the case against anonymity, a strong 
form of privacy, in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334 (1995). Anonymity, he wrote, is 
generally dishonorable: “It facilitates wrong by eliminating accountability, which is ordinarily the very 
purpose of the anonymity.” Id. at 385 (Scalia, J., dissenting). To create legal protection for anonymous 
communication absent a reason to expect “threats, harassment, or reprisals,” he argued, “seems to me a 
distortion of the past that will lead to a coarsening of the future.” Id. 
2. A “smart city” is a “data-driven city [that] depends on data collected from buildings, infrastructure, 
people, and third-party data brokers. Government agencies, quasi-governmental utilities, commercial 
interests, and others will trace, analyze, and predict the movements, needs, and scarcities of citizens in the 
city in order to manage resources and protect the community most effectively.” Janine S. Hiller & Jordan 
M. Blanke, Smart Cities, Big Data, and the Resilience of Privacy, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 309, 311 (2017). 
Commonly, the monitoring devices will include components of the so-called “Internet of Things.” See Jesse 
W. Woo, Smart Cities Pose Privacy Risks and Other Problems, but That Doesn’t Mean We Shouldn’t Build 
Them, 85 UMKC L. REV. 953, 955 (2017). The result, in either case, is “ubiquitous surveillance.” Kelsey 
Finch & Omer Tene, Welcome to the Metropticon: Protecting Privacy in a Hyperconnected Town, 41 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1581, 1582 (2014). For discussion of some of the privacy issues raised by extensive 
data collection in smart cities, see ALVARO ARTIGAS, INSTITUT BARCELONA D'ESTUDIS INTERNACIONALS, 
SURVEILLANCE, SMART TECHNOLOGIES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF SAFE CITY SOLUTIONS: THE CASE OF 
CHINESE ICT FIRMS AND THEIR INTERNATIONAL EXPANSION TO EMERGING MARKETS 1 (2017), 
https://www.ibei.org/surveillance-smart-technologies-and-the-development-of-safe-city-solutions-the-
case-of-chinese-ict-firms-and-their-international-expansion-to-emerging-markets_112561.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CP8X-477M]; THEO BASS, EMMA SUTHERLAND & TOM SYMONS, DECODE, RECLAIMING 
THE SMART CITY PERSONAL DATA, TRUST AND THE NEW COMMONS  (2018), 
https://media.nesta.org.uk/documents/DECODE-2018_report-smart-cities.pdf [https://perma.cc/7LJZ-
X2BR]; Finch & Tene, supra note 2. A somewhat more positive account appears in Woo, supra note 2. 
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Second, the current—and understandable—focus on the data-
protection strand of privacy protection (which focuses on the how) 
threatens to obscure other worthy justifications for privacy (the why). 
That privacy enhances safety is, most certainly, not a new idea. But, with 
the possible exception of debates over electronic privacy, concepts of 
safety tend not to figure centrally in contemporary conversations about 
privacy. With the coming of smart cities and other types of mass 
surveillance in the physical and electronic realms, however, personal 
privacy is threatened as never before.3 It is time, therefore, for some 
modern threat analysis: in what ways are people put in danger—
physically, economically, politically—by having others within the private 
or public sectors know things about them? We seek to rescue this aspect 
of the privacy pantheon from its slide into relative obscurity. 
Third, we seek to lay a foundation for future work4 showing how—if 
privacy is indeed a form of safety—it follows that a number of U.S. 
administrative agencies charged with ensuring various aspects of public 
safety have a heretofore unacknowledged duty to consider privacy issues 
when crafting their regulations.5 
Demonstrating that privacy is actually a form of safety will, in turn, 
open the door for future U.S. administrative-law arguments that federal 
agencies with safety missions—including the Federal Aviation 
Administration,6 the Consumer Product Safety Commission,7 and the 
Food and Drug Administration8—are legally obligated to consider privacy 
consequences when drafting safety rules that directly or indirectly affect 
privacy.9 Drawing attention to the ways in which privacy enhances safety 
                                                   
3. See infra section III.B.2, Part IV. 
4. Tentatively titled “Safety as Privacy.” 
5. In the United States, there are a number of agencies with statutory obligations to protect public 
safety in various ways. For example, the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is charged with 
protecting public safety in air transportation. In crafting rules for the regulation of unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAVs), commonly known as drones, the FAA has consistently taken the position that its 
safety mandate is limited to physical safety and does not require—if indeed it even permits—
consideration of the privacy-related consequences of UAV usage. See, e.g., Operation and 
Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 80 Fed. Reg. 9544, 9552–53 (Feb. 23, 2015) (to 
be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 21, 43, 45, 47, 61, 91, 101, 107, and 183). 
6. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 40104 (2012) (“The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration 
shall encourage the development of civil aeronautics and safety of air commerce in and outside the 
United States.”). 
7. See Griswold Insulation Co. v. Lula Cotton Processing Co., 540 F. Supp. 1334, 1339 (M.D. 
Tenn. 1982) (holding that economic injury is in the scope of Consumer Product Safety Commission 
(CPSC) regulation, as the statutory term “risk of injury” is not limited to physical injury). 
8. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 393 (2012) (requiring FDA to ensure that “there is reasonable assurance 
of the safety and effectiveness of [regulated] devices intended for human use”). 
9. The court declined to reach this issue in Electronic Privacy Information Center v. Federal 
Aviation Administration, 892 F.3d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 
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should lead more routinely to treating privacy as a legitimate object of 
safety agendas. This instrumental goal (not to mention our own parochial 
limitations) explains the U.S.-centric approach in what follows. 
This Article proceeds in four Parts. It begins by offering working 
definitions of two key terms: “privacy” and “safety.” The second Part 
looks at contemporary privacy theory and offers some justifications for 
our claim that the safety value of privacy plays only a very small role. The 
third and longest Part turns from theory to practice, and provides a catalog 
of rules and circumstances in which the U.S. legal system explicitly or 
implicitly recognizes the importance of privacy as a means of achieving 
safety. The fourth Part identifies certain technological (and in one case 
social) innovations that threaten privacy and in so doing undermine safety; 
to the extent that these innovations are susceptible to regulation, it likely 
follows that making rules to protect personal privacy would make 
people  safer. 
The Article concludes that both theoretical discussions of privacy and 
practical attempts to make both safety-enhancing and privacy-enhancing 
policies would benefit from taking fuller account of the important role that 
privacy can play in making us safe. 
I. TWO DEFINITIONS 
A. Privacy 
Privacy is a notoriously protean concept. It is social.10 It is 
multifarious.11 It is sometimes said to be incoherent.12 If judged solely by 
                                                   
10. See BARRINGTON MOORE, JR., PRIVACY: STUDIES IN SOCIAL AND CULTURAL HISTORY 
73  (1984). 
11. See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (2006). 
12. See Julie E. Cohen, Turning Privacy Inside Out, 20 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1, 1 (2019) 
(“The problem of theorizing privacy moves on two levels, the first consisting of an inadequate 
conceptual vocabulary and the second consisting of an inadequate institutional grammar. Theories 
about privacy have a tendency to dissolve into contradictions. So, for example, one justification 
commonly asserted for privacy is that it promotes and protects individual autonomy, but making 
privacy serve autonomy effectively is impossible unless one confronts the constructedness of 
selfhood. Another common justification for privacy is that it promotes and protects an essential degree 
of separation between self and society. That justification is implicitly predicated on the reality of 
social construction, but making privacy serve the construction of selfhood effectively is impossible 
unless one confronts privacy’s social (i.e., collective) value.”); Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing 
Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1088—89 (2002) (footnotes omitted) (“Time and again 
philosophers, legal theorists, and jurists have lamented the great difficulty in reaching a satisfying 
conception of privacy. Arthur Miller has declared that privacy is ‘difficult to define because it is 
exasperatingly vague and evanescent.’ According to Julie Inness, the legal and philosophical 
discourse of privacy is in a state of ‘chaos.’ Alan Westin has stated that ‘[f]ew values so fundamental 
to society as privacy have been left so undefined in social theory . . . .’ William Beaney has noted that 
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the volume of academic writing today, though, privacy is about data 
protection.13 This is only natural: due to rapid technical change, 
informational privacy is the fastest-shriveling portion of the privacy 
landscape. It is the area where, thanks largely to the European Union’s 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),14 we see the most legal 
ferment. 
Privacy theorists’ focus on informational privacy crowds out the 
safety-enhancing aspects of privacy from contemporary conversations 
even though it is common to state that privacy is important to allow human 
flourishing.15 For example, Julie Cohen sees privacy as necessary to “the 
                                                   
‘even the most strenuous advocate of a right to privacy must confess that there are serious problems 
of defining the essence and scope of this right.’ Privacy has ‘a protean capacity to be all things to all 
lawyers,’ Tom Gerety has observed. According to Robert Post, ‘[p]rivacy is a value so complex, so 
entangled in competing and contradictory dimensions, so engorged with various and distinct 
meanings, that I sometimes despair whether it can be usefully addressed at all.’ Several theorists have 
surveyed the interests that the law protects under the rubric of privacy and have concluded that they 
are distinct and unrelated. Judith Thompson has even argued that privacy as a concept serves no useful 
function, for what we call privacy really amounts to a set of other more primary interests.”). 
13. See Bert-Jaap Koops et al., A Typology of Privacy, 38 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 483, 487–88 (2017) 
(noting “the trend, visible since the 1960s, to focus predominantly on informational privacy and 
data  protection”). 
14. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on 
the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), OJ 
L [2016] 119/1 at Arts. 17, 21 [hereinafter GDPR]. 
15. A few examples are FERDINAND D. SCHOEMAN, PRIVACY AND SOCIAL FREEDOM 22 (1992) 
(stating privacy “protect[s] individuals from the overreaching control of others”); Chris Clark, Against 
Confidentiality? Privacy, Safety and the Public Good in Professional Communications, 6(2) J. SOC. 
WORK 117, 124 (2006) (“[T]he point of privacy-as-seclusion is . . . that it serves to protect the sphere 
of the private-as-non-public. Without protection of the private-as-non-public the way is open to 
fascism and other sorts of totalitarianism.”); Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer 
Look at Copyright Management in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981, 1006—07 (1996) (arguing 
that “[t]houghts and opinions, which are the predicates to speech, cannot arise in a vacuum,” and a 
right to read anonymously is necessary for the “iterative process of ‘speech-formation—which 
determines, ultimately, both the content of one’s speech and the particular viewpoint one espouses”); 
H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., Privacy and Limited Democracy: The Moral Centrality of Persons, 17(2) 
SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 120 (2000) (noting that rights to privacy mark where individuals continue to 
maintain authority over themselves); Daniel E. Newman, European Union and United States Personal 
Information Privacy, and Human Rights Philosophy - Is There a Match, 22 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. 
L.J. 307, 312 (2008) (“If a person is unable to control access to personal information about herself, 
then she may be subjected to unwanted social pressures to conform to norms that she may not 
otherwise wish to adopt.”); id. at 315 (“Privacy, as interiority, is meant to preserve inner-reflection, 
which leads to outer, social good through the activity of a self-reflective, self-realized individual.”); 
Jed Rubenfeld, The Right to Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 784 (1989) (arguing that core of right 
to privacy is the right to determine the course of one’s own life); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence 
of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973, 979 (1991) (internal footnotes omitted) (“[Privacy] provides an 
opportunity for individual self-development, for individual decision making and for protection against 
endless caretaking. In addition, there are other related aspects of privacy, such as the notion of 
autonomy, equality, liberty, and freedom of bodily integrity, that are central to women’s independence 
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liberal self’s capacity for critical independence of thought and judgment, 
its commitments to self-actualization and reason, and its aspiration to 
cosmopolitanism” all of which she describes as “essential tools for 
identifying and pursuing the material and political conditions for self-
fulfillment and more broadly for human flourishing.”16 “Privacy,” agrees 
Ryan Calo, “is best understood as an instrument of human flourishing.”17 
It is much less common—even in accounts that view privacy as a solely 
instrumental good—to discuss privacy as enhancing safety. This Article 
seeks to contribute to the development of privacy theory by 
filling  that  gap. 
But before assessing the role of safety in privacy theory, it is helpful to 
provide, as context, an overview of certain significant and influential 
understandings or definitions of what “privacy” is and why it is important. 
Scholars routinely lament the difficulty of defining “privacy.” 
According to Daniel J. Solove, this definitional difficulty stems, in part, 
from an inability to see the forest for the trees.18 Theorists have failed to 
develop a useful conception of the term, Solove argues, because they have 
generally “failed to adequately conceptualize the problems that privacy 
law is asked to redress.”19 Untethered to a notion of what privacy should 
do, scholars have been unable to say what it is. 
1. Earlier Definitions of Privacy 
Perhaps because of this difficulty, definitions of privacy can be very 
general. Famously, Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren wrote that privacy 
is the “right to be let alone.”20 This fundamental insight remains one of 
the most cited and influential definitions of privacy in the past 100 years. 
Another foundational conception of privacy traces to Alan Westin’s 
1967 book Privacy and Freedom. Westin understood privacy as a four-
stage spectrum—solitude, intimacy, anonymity, and reserve—in which 
the individual’s involvement with the public sphere increases at each 
                                                   
and well-being.”). 
16. Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1911 (2013). 
17. Ryan Calo, Privacy and Markets: A Love Story, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 649, 651 (2015) 
(citing Cohen, supra note 16). 
18. Solove, supra note 12, at 1090. 
19. Id.  
20. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193 
(1890). Cf. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (writing 
that U.S. Constitution “conferred, as against the government, the right to be let alone–the most 
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men”).  
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stage.21 Solitude is the most complete type of privacy that one can achieve. 
It is marked by isolation from other people, leaving one alone with one’s 
thoughts.22 Moving one step closer to the public sphere, intimacy refers to 
an individual’s involvement in a small social circle: with spouses, 
partners, friends, families, or other close-knit communities like 
coworkers.23 Anonymity exists where one resides in the public sphere but 
nevertheless avoids the focused attention of others.24 This is a type of 
“public privacy,” or privacy in public.25 The final state—reserve—
involves the erection of barriers to prevent others from accessing 
information about oneself.26 These barriers may grow from the subject, as 
where one declines to share information, or from the discretion of the 
others, as where the individual relies on the restraint of others to avoid the 
sharing of the private.27 
In contrast, Solove argues for a “pragmatic” approach to 
conceptualizing privacy, “focusing on the palpable consequences of 
[privacy] rather than on [its] correspondence to an ultimate reality.”28 In 
this way, Solove subscribes to philosopher John Dewey’s view that 
“philosophical inquiry should begin as a response to dealing with life’s 
problems and difficulties.”29 Specifically, Solove argues that “privacy” is 
best understood through Ludwig Wittgenstein’s concept of “family 
resemblances.”30 The idea of “family resemblances” rejects the 
proposition that a concept—for example, privacy—can be defined 
through identification of universally applicable necessary and sufficient 
conditions, or “rigid conceptual boundaries and common 
denominators.”31 Thus rejecting the search for a term’s essence, 
Wittgenstein instead looks to the “complicated network of similarities 
overlapping and crisscrossing.”32 Correspondingly, Solove suggests we 
                                                   
21. ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AS FREEDOM 31–32 (1967). 
22. Id. at 31. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. at 32. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. Solove, supra note 12, at 1091. 
29. Id. at 1093 (citing JOHN DEWEY, LOGIC, THE THEORY OF INQUIRY 106–10 (Jo Ann Boydston 
ed., 1988)).  
30. Id. at 1092, 1126–27. 
31. Id. at 1126. 
32. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, § 66, 27 (G.E.M. Anscombe 
trans., 1958). 
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look to pools of similarities and differences between different types or 
aspects of things that might be considered private. Solove himself looks 
to privacy “practices”—“activities, customs, norms, and traditions”33—to 
identify the manner in which the concept has developed as a matter of 
reality. To “define” the term, therefore, Solove focuses on “certain matters 
[that] Western societies have long understood as private: the family, the 
body, and the home.”34 
In this view, privacy is that collection of things that we consider private 
and that, in practice, are treated as private. It is a descriptivist approach, 
and it seeks to reflect commonsensical understandings of what is, or 
should be, private. The descriptivist approach, however, leads to another 
potential problem in defining “privacy”: people’s professed 
understanding of what is or should be private often does not track with 
their actions.35 That is, while people say they want privacy, their actions 
often suggest otherwise. 
Helen Nissenbaum seeks to resolve this seeming contradiction with her 
theory of privacy as contextual integrity.36 Her approach to understanding 
privacy is analogous to tort law’s focus on reasonableness. Heavily 
contextual, what might be private in one situation might not be private in 
another. A privacy violation, then, is not merely the sharing of given 
information, but the inappropriate sharing thereof—an inquiry that calls 
for an evaluation of context.37 Nissenbaum’s definition of privacy 
violations suggests that people are not, in the main, insincere or irrational 
when they state a preference for privacy but act in ways that seem to 
undermine that preference: 
If a right to privacy is a right to context-appropriate flows [of 
information], and not to secrecy or to control over information 
about oneself, there is no paradox in caring deeply about privacy 
and, at the same time, eagerly sharing information as long as the 
sharing and withholding conform with the principled conditions 
prescribed by governing contextual norms.38 
                                                   
33. See Solove, supra note 12, at 1092. 
34. Id. at 1093. 
35. See, e.g., HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE 
INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 104–08 (2010) (recognizing the “stark contradiction” between people’s 
stated concern for privacy and their actions: “[i]n almost all situations in which people must choose 
between privacy and just about any other good, they choose the other good,” for example, “credit 
cards over cash, E-ZPass over traditional toll payments, . . . traceable search engines over self-
directed Web surfing”). 
36. Id. 
37. See id. at 186–230. 
38. Id. at 187. 
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Julie E. Cohen’s definition of privacy is similar in the sense that it is 
dynamic, incapable of being reduced to a “fixed condition or attribute 
(such as seclusion or control) whose boundaries can be crisply delineated 
by the application of deductive logic.”39 But while Nissenbaum defines 
privacy in relation to the full spectrum of possible contexts, Cohen’s 
approach is narrower, connecting privacy to notions of autonomy and self-
development: 
Privacy is shorthand for breathing room to engage in the 
processes of boundary management that enable and constitute 
self-development. So understood, privacy is fundamentally 
dynamic. In a world characterized by pervasive social shaping of 
subjectivity, privacy fosters (partial) self-determination. It 
enables individuals both to maintain relational ties and to develop 
critical perspectives on the world around them.40 
To Cohen, privacy is valuable, in part, because it permits self-
development which is necessary for the development of the informed 
citizenry on which the viability of liberal democracy depends.41 To 
achieve this end, society must protect the physical, economic, and mental 
safety of the marginalized,42 all of which we would call forms of safety. 
2. A Typology of Privacy 
Others take a very different approach to defining privacy. In an original 
and thorough recent article, A Typology of Privacy, (hereinafter Typology) 
a group of scholars led by Bert-Jaap Koops offer a lens by which to rethink 
our understanding of privacy. These scholars identify eight basic, or 
“ideal,” types of privacy, and a ninth type that overlaps with and touches 
each of them.43 Typology claims that privacy “can be captured by [this] 
set of related concepts that together constitute privacy.”44 The eight ideal 
types are: (1) bodily, (2) spatial, (3) communicational, (4) proprietary or 
property-based, (5) intellectual, (6) decisional, (7) associational, 
and  (8) behavioral.45 
The overlay, which does not completely overlap with the eight ideal 
                                                   
39. Cohen, supra note 16, at 1906. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. at 1912–18. 
42. See id. 
43. Koops et al., supra note 13, at 566–68. 
44. Id. at 488 (emphasis omitted). 
45. Id. at 566–68. 
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types, is informational privacy.46 Despite recognizing the frequency with 
which informational privacy is treated as a distinct type of privacy, the 
authors argue that, because “each ideal type of privacy contains an 
element of informational privacy,” it is better understood as an overlay.47 
As to the eight ideal types of privacy, the authors have analyzed their 
similarities and differences along certain “dimensions.” They first map 
them along a spectrum of four zones of privacy, running from “the 
personal or completely private zone to intimate, semi-private, and public 
zones.”48 Building here on Alan Westin’s foundational categorization of 
solitude, intimacy, anonymity and reserve,49 as well as work by Roger 
Clarke, Anita Allen, Rachel L. Finn, David Wright and Michael 
Friedewald, the authors offer the following definitions: 
The intimate zone is characterized by a shift towards social 
engagement, albeit limited to intimate partners, family members, 
and close friends, as well as activities that take place in private 
and fenced-off spaces, such as the home where people share their 
life with intimate partners and family. The semi-private zone 
includes social interaction with a wider range of actors, including 
acquaintances, work colleagues, and professional relationships 
(e.g., interacting with a doctor, service provider or shop), and 
activities that occur in more quasi-public space. The public zone 
is typified by activities occurring in public—for example, in a 
public square, on public transportation, or on publicly accessible 
electronic platforms—where the privacy interest is characterized 
by the desire to be inconspicuous despite being physically or 
virtually visible in public space. This zone sits at the edge of the 
outer layer of privacy and social life.50 
The authors also map their eight ideal types along the spectrum of 
negative and positive freedom, although they concede this distinction has 
some difficulties.51 Finally, they map the types based on distinctions 
between “restricted access and subsequent control after access has been 
granted.”52 On this point, they note that, generally: 
This dimension is not independent from the other two, but rather 
combines both in the sense that restricted access is associated 
more (but not exclusively) with the private than with the public 
                                                   
46. Id. at 568. 
47. Id. at 568–69. 
48. Id. at 564. 
49. See supra section I.A.1. 
50. Koops et al., supra note 13, at 564 (emphasis omitted). 
51. Id. at 565. 
52. Id.  
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zone, and more with negative freedom than with positive 
freedom, while control after access is more significant in the 
semi-private and public zones and has more the character of a 
positive freedom (self-determination) . . . . For example, any 
privacy interest in a person’s behavior in public space has more 
to do with controlling the use of information about that activity 
than it does with restricting access (since some access has already 
been granted by the nature of the space itself). On the other hand, 
bodily privacy is typically (although not always) a question of 
access, rather than control.53 
 The authors also give us a graphical summary of the 
Typology’s  landscape: 
 
Figure 1: 
Summary of the Privacy Typology54 
 
 
Our overall conception of privacy is as broad as that in the Typology: it 
includes negative and positive freedom; it refers to restricted access and 
restricted post-acquisition use; it includes physical aspects of privacy as 
well as informational aspects. That said, our focus on safety means that 
we first emphasize directly physical privacy, and only then intellectual 
privacy, followed by economic and other forms of privacy, although 
informational privacy also remains important because the safety issues we 
discuss arise from allowing others to acquire information about 
                                                   
53. Id. 
54. Id. at 484. 
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their  target. 
Claims to each of these aspects of privacy, whether or not they are 
claims to a “right” of privacy, include demands to be able to exclude 
others, or their mechanical proxies, from places and things, including, 
but—importantly—not limited to, data. Privacy protects access to 
physical bodies, and it protects against the observation of facts about the 
location and activities of bodies. It also does similar work for our things: 
inhibiting or preventing access to them, the observation of them, and the 
collection of information about their location, uses, and characteristics. 
Because our discussion involves so much of what the Typology deems the 
overlay of informational privacy, we turn to a brief discussion of 
informational privacy. 
3. Informational Privacy 
Persons can control the release of information about themselves in 
different ways, depending on the circumstances. Controlled access might 
be achieved, for example, by unobservability,55 by untraceability,56 by 
anonymity,57 or by pseudonymity. This Article thus involves minimal 
discussion of the aspects of privacy that motivate much work on data 
protection, where the focus is frequently on limiting a recipient’s use of 
another’s data. Such legal limits, notably those in GDPR,58 undoubtedly 
protect privacy in different and sometimes more general ways than the 
one that demands our attention here,59 as those aspects of privacy fail to 
engage issues of safety as directly as the aspects we have chosen to 
focus  on. 
Admittedly, it is not difficult to formulate or even justify many “claims 
                                                   
55. “Unobservability is when you can not be observed. For example, shutting the door to the 
bathroom offers unobservability.” Adam Shostack & Paul Syverson, What Price Privacy? – and Why 
Identity Theft is About Neither Identity Nor Theft, in ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION SECURITY 129, 
130 (L. Jean Camp & Stephen Lewis, eds. 2004). 
56. “Untraceability is when you cannot be traced from one identity to another. For example, ‘John, 
who we play softball with, but don’t know his last name’ is untraceable; you can’t track down a phone 
number for him.” Id.; see also A. Michael Froomkin, Anonymity and Its Enmities, 1 J. ONLINE L. art. 
4 (1995) [hereinafter, Froomkin, Anonymity], https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2
715621 (last visited Mar. 9, 2020) (distinguishing between traceable and untraceable forms of 
anonymity and pseudonymity). 
57. “Anonymity is when you are without any identifiers.” Shostack & Syverson, supra note 55, 
at 130.  
58. See GDPR, supra note 14. 
59. “Informational self-determination is when you are confident that information you provide will 
be used only in ways you understand and approve. Giving your mother your new phone number 
probably qualifies.” Shostack & Syverson, supra note 55, at 130. 
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to exclude” as claims to prevent others from learning facts about oneself, 
and thus to formulate claims to exclude as claims about data, broadly 
defined. That is, excluding people from one’s home prevents others from 
seeing quite how horrible one is before one’s morning coffee. Excluding 
people from one’s credit-card records prevents them from seeing how 
cheap or spendthrift one may be. Excluding others from one’s medical 
records protects against employment consequences, or just 
embarrassment, that might arise from one’s health problems being 
publicized. Excluding the world from one’s diary secures the freedom to 
experiment with stupid or potentially unpopular ideas. 
It is important to note, however, that the privacy which prevents access 
to bodies and things, and to facts about bodies and things, is not simply 
regulating the management of data about persons—in most cases it forbids 
or even makes physically impossible the collection of those data. That can 
be a distinction with a difference.60 
B. Safety 
“Safety,” like privacy, is a malleable concept. It is also potentially quite 
broad, and we mean to use it broadly. By “safety,” we mean, first, the 
ability to protect one’s bodily integrity, and that of one’s family and 
associates, from physical harms and/or threats. Secondarily, we mean the 
ability to protect one’s livelihood and one’s possessions (and that of 
family and associates) from harm, or threat or diminishment. Both of these 
types of safety protect against an array of potential exercises of unjustified 
coercive power, ranging from threats of violence, to blackmail, to routine 
price discrimination. And as explained below, both of those types of 
safety can be indirectly secured or at least enhanced by the protection of 
privacy. Furthermore, to the extent that privacy can create a sense of 
safety and security, it may provide important psychological benefits, 
translating at times into physiological ones.61 
We therefore adopt a definition of “safety” that may not be intuitively 
obvious. For example, we treat situations that may subject an individual 
to atypical economic coercion as dangers that may make one unsafe. 
Similarly, we treat blackmail—which threatens shame—as a safety threat. 
Arguably, the capability to impose substantial emotional stress is itself a 
                                                   
60. Cf. A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461 (2000) (arguing for 
regulation of data-collection technology in part because once data is collected it is harder to regulate); 
A. Michael Froomkin, Regulating Mass Surveillance as Privacy Pollution: Learning from 
Environmental Impact Statements, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1713 (2015) (proposing that some 
surveillance technology be regulated as environmental damage). 
61. See infra text accompanying note 76 and sections III.B.1, B.2. 
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safety threat if only because emotional stress can have physical effects. 
 
To argue that privacy (as defined) is safety (as defined), or at least can 
be a substantial contributor to safety, is (1) to argue that in many cases 
privacy reduces certain dangers and (2) to argue, implicitly or explicitly, 
that safety from those dangers is at least good and legitimate,62 and 
perhaps even necessary for the enjoyment of some other right, e.g., rights 
to life, liberty, or property. The instrumental argument that privacy is 
safety engages implicitly or explicitly with claims (or counter-claims) that 
privacy is harmful, for instance, that it actually makes people less safe. 
These competing instrumental claims clash in the shadow not only of 
claims that privacy is itself a human right63 (in which case claims that 
privacy is harmful might lose relevance), but also of claims that various 
other human rights are furthered by privacy or a lack thereof. Thus, for 
example, the twin debates over the legal regulation of cryptography and 
over legal demands for data-retention policies have largely consisted of 
factual assertions about how those policies will protect or harm 
individuals.64 However, these debates have also at times touched on these 
policies’ interactions with rights to freedom of expression, to freedom of 
association, and even to property.65 
In Part III, below, we describe how a variety of existing legal rules 
reflect a recognition that privacy enhances safety. As regards our 
discussion of the dangers that privacy protects against, we adopt a worst-
case-analysis framework in the interest of simplification. By focusing on 
the danger to the individual (harms that have some probability of 
happening), rather than on risk (which implies a measure of the actual 
likelihood of the event), we focus on the capabilities of those against 
whom privacy is interposed as a defense, rather than engaging with the 
intruder’s intentions. By using the word “intruder,” we mean to connote 
both an intrusion into someone’s private affairs such as informational 
privacy breach and also an actual physical intrusion. The intentions of 
people, firms, and governments are not only varied but often opaque; a 
focus on capabilities rather than intentions reduces the scope of what 
remains a large and difficult problem, as one need not try to read minds. 
Similarly, we leave for another day a discussion of cost-benefit 
calculations, in which one tries to compare alleged costs of privacy with 
                                                   
62. This is so because, while privacy is sometimes assailed as a negative, safety is almost always 
viewed as a positive, although there can be exceptions: making terrorists safer is not, we presume, 
generally considered a positive. 
63. See infra text accompanying notes 213 and 335. 
64. See infra section III.E.3. 
65. See id. 
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alleged benefits, as these too require an assessment of probable, rather 
than simply possible, actions. 
II. THE ROLE OF SAFETY IN CONTEMPORARY 
PRIVACY THEORY 
Contemporary privacy theory, by and large, pays too little attention to 
the ways in which privacy enhances safety. That does not mean that 
contemporary privacy theorists fail to recognize the point, just that few of 
them address it in any detail, perhaps because it seems obvious, or perhaps 
because the idea is not central to their arguments. 
The failure to address privacy’s impact on safety may also be a result 
of the specific approaches, discussed in section I.A.1 above, that scholars 
have taken in their attempts to describe privacy. One common approach 
to defining the term has been the attempt to “develop a unitary conception 
of privacy in the form of a unified conceptual core,”66 which is most 
similar to how we generally define terms. To those taking this approach, 
safety is likely an afterthought.67 Interrelated though we argue privacy and 
safety are, we do not suggest that safety forms the very core of privacy’s 
meaning or value. 
The second typical approach to defining privacy has been to catalogue 
different types or aspects of privacy and “mak[e] meaningful distinctions 
between” them.68 This approach is obviously descriptive rather than 
prescriptive, but it can still offer hints at a definition of privacy by locating 
its common, and perhaps necessary or sufficient, characteristics or 
conditions. One might expect safety to figure more prominently under this 
approach, as there clearly exist clusters of privacy protections that bear on 
safety. Yet, with the partial exception of the Typology, which does discuss 
safety at times, we see little of this in the literature. 
A third approach treats privacy as inherently good. This is the approach 
taken by authors like Julie Cohen. Other than to note that preserving the 
“breathing room” for the self is necessary for the self-development that 
enables both human flourishing and meaningful democratic 
participation,69 Julie Cohen’s work does not focus on the interplay of 
privacy and safety. To Cohen, privacy is not simply of instrumental value. 
It is inherently good. Pushing back against the commoditization of 
privacy, Cohen argues that privacy’s rightful place is alongside values like 
                                                   
66. See Koops et al., supra note 13, at 487; Solove, supra note 12, at 1095–99. 
67. See supra text accompanying note 15. 
68. Koops et al., supra note 13, at 487; Solove, supra note 12, at 1095–99. 
69. See Cohen, supra note 16, at 1906 and text accompanying notes 40–41. 
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dignity, equality, and freedom, because it is a necessary condition for the 
development of the self.70 To Cohen, “the values of informational privacy 
are far more fundamental” than a mere matter of preference or taste.71 “A 
degree of freedom from scrutiny and categorization by others promotes 
important noninstrumental values, and serves vital individual and 
collective ends.”72 
A fourth approach is the one that most often leads scholars to expressly 
connect privacy to safety. It is a “reductionist approach[] that define[s] 
privacy as instrumental to realizing a more basic human value, such as 
liberty, autonomy, property, or bodily integrity.”73 In some ways, this 
instrumental approach is not about defining privacy but identifying its 
value. That makes it most likely to discuss safety. The relationship 
between privacy and safety grows less out of a definition of privacy than 
from an understanding of its practical value. Still, even where authors 
address the instrumental value of privacy, they often omit any mention 
of  safety.74 
The instrumental approach is, in a sense, the one adopted by this 
Article. Our definition of privacy is, as noted above, encompassing. On 
the other hand, we make no claim that safety enhancement is a necessary 
or sufficient condition for privacy. Instead, we argue that one way in 
which privacy is valuable is its ability to enhance safety. Whether it is 
necessary or sufficient for safety will vary with the circumstances. 
                                                   
70. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 
STAN. L. REV. 1373 (2000). 
71. Id. at 1423. 
72. Id. 
73. Koops et al., supra note 13, at 492; see also, e.g., Judith J. Thompson, The Right to Privacy, in 
PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY 272 (Ferdinand D. Schoeman, ed., 1984) (arguing that 
privacy, as a concept, is worthless because the term, as generally used, simply amounts to a group of 
other, more fundamental, interests).  
74. See, e.g., Solove, supra note 12, at 1093–94 (listing the fundamental interests instrumentally 
enhanced by privacy, neglecting to mention safety, and going on to state that “[s]ociety’s commitment 
to privacy often entails restraining or even sacrificing interests of substantial importance, such 
as . . . efficient law enforcement”). Solove also references the portion of privacy discourse that views 
“the value of privacy in terms of furthering a number of different ends.” Id. at 1145. In fact, this is 
Solove’s approach: “I contend that privacy should be valued instrumentally.” Id. at 1144. Looking to 
prior scholarship, Solove states, “Fried claims that privacy fosters love and friendship. Bloustein 
argues that privacy protects dignity and individuality. Boling and Inness claim that privacy is 
necessary for intimate human relationships. According to Gavison, privacy is essential for autonomy 
and freedom.” Id. at 1145 (citations omitted). Then, looking to his own instrumental understanding 
of privacy, he notes that “there are a number of candidates for the value of privacy, as privacy fosters 
self-creation, independence, autonomy, creativity, imagination, counter-culture, freedom of thought, 
and reputation.” Id. at 1145–46. Thus, we see that even in the scholarship that argues for an 
instrumental valuation of privacy, and lists the interests furthered by privacy protections, safety rarely 
if ever makes the list.  
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In any event, regardless of why privacy is generally not recognized as 
enhancing safety, our research suggests there is an absence that needs 
filling. Of contemporary works that do address the relationship, most do 
so only in passing,75 although there are a few important exceptions. 
A leading and significant exception to this near-rule is Alan Westin, 
who, in his seminal Privacy and Freedom, suggested that privacy has its 
deepest roots in the evolutionary drive towards safety. Nature, he claimed, 
resounds with “defiant cr[ies] for privacy, given within the borders of the 
animal’s private territory to warn off possible intruders.”76 
For Westin, therefore, the desire for privacy arises fundamentally from 
a search for safety. Privacy promotes the physical safety of bodies and 
things by making it harder for would-be intruders to intrude.77 It protects 
something in the nature of “economic safety” by “regulating density to 
available resources.”78 Protecting these resources is also arguably 
connected to physical safety insofar as scarcity threatens physical health. 
Westin also recognizes how overcrowding, i.e., a lack of personal space, 
leads to increased aggression and infighting within communities as 
members attempt to access scarce resources (and perhaps also as the result 
of a biological imperative to control crowding).79 Finally, Westin notes 
that privacy promotes safety from illness, as a lack of space leads humans 
and animals to “high blood pressure, circulatory diseases, and heart 
disease.”80 
Turning then to humans, Westin quotes from Robert Merton’s Social 
                                                   
75. Even in Koops et al., supra note 13, where the authors discuss several aspects of privacy that 
are related to safety, they do not consider it as a category. In discussing the types of privacy protected 
in the constitutions of various nations, the authors identify spatial privacy–the protection of the home 
and other places–which could enhance physical safety (by, perhaps, preventing police officers from 
storming in and initiating an armed confrontation) and mental safety or wellbeing. See id. at 515–16. 
They identify proprietary, or property-based, privacy, which could enhance economic safety. See id. 
at 516–18. They identify privacy of computers, which could enhance mental safety or wellbeing (by 
avoiding embarrassment, perhaps about one’s browser history) and economic safety. See id. at 518–
20. They identify the privacy of the person, part of which is the protection of the body of the person, 
which clearly could enhance physical safety and mental safety or wellbeing. See id. at 529–31. They 
expressly note, for example, that the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects 
the right of people to be “‘secure in their persons’” against unreasonable search and seizure, which 
incorporates the inviolability of the body. Id. at 530. They even cite U.S. Supreme Court cases in 
which the Fourth Amendment operated to protect against physical intrusions into one’s body. Id. at 
530 n.170. Still, the ability of privacy to enhance safety is never discussed, in such terms, as one of 
the values of privacy.  
76. WESTIN, supra note 21, at 9. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 10 (internal citation omitted). 
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Theory and Social Structure in arguing that, without privacy, the average 
individual would descend into madness: individuals’ “need” for 
privacy  is the 
 
counterpart to the functional requirement of social structure that 
some measure of exemption from full observability be provided 
for. Otherwise, the pressure to live up to the details of all (and 
often conflicting) social norms would become literally 
unbearable; in a complex society, schizophrenic behavior would 
become the rule rather than the formidable exception it 
already  is.81 
Building on Westin’s ideas, Adam D. Moore argues that privacy “is 
necessary for the species.”82 He cites a study finding that, when rats are 
placed in a quarter-acre pen without any privacy, their numbers never 
exceeded 200.83 Even when the population reached 150, “fighting became 
so disruptive to normal maternal care that only a few of the young 
survived.”84 But when privacy protections were put in place, that same 
quarter-acre pen was able to support 5,000 rats.85 Moore concludes, then, 
“that having the ability to separate, like food and water, is a necessity 
of  life.”86 
Moore extends this conclusion to the human animal. He, like Westin, 
recognizes a “link between a lack of privacy and psychological and 
physical disorders in humans [as well as] nonhuman animals.”87 Modern 
studies on overcrowding in prisons support Moore’s conclusion: the lack 
of personal space attendant to incarceration “has been linked to violence, 
depression, suicide, psychological disorders, and recidivism.”88 Moore 
then shifts his focus, arguing that “it is only through enhanced privacy 
protections that we can obtain appropriate levels of security against 
industrial espionage, unwarranted invasions into private domains, and 
information warfare or terrorism.”89 Relatedly, Moore recognizes that 
privacy promotes security in the context of encryption.90 
                                                   
81. Id. at 58 (quoting ROBERT MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 375 (1957)). 
82. ADAM D. MOORE, PRIVACY RIGHTS: MORAL AND LEGAL FOUNDATIONS 48 (2010).  
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 55. 
88. Id. at 55–56. 
89. Id. at 207. 
90. Id. at 208–09 (“Although the National Security Administration’s position is that the widespread 
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A quite different, if equally rare, example of scholarship addressing the 
interaction of privacy and safety is Ruth Gavison’s 1980 article Privacy 
and the Limits of Law.91 Gavison recognizes the instrumental value of 
privacy, noting that one such benefit is “mental health.”92 Interestingly, 
though, she argues that the opposite can be true simultaneously—that 
privacy may be harmful to mental health.93 Gavison is receptive to those 
“critics of contemporary society” who argue that “we suffer from too 
much privacy,” that we deify the private sphere and ignore public aspects 
of life such that “individuals are alienated, lonely, and scared.”94 
To Gavison, then, privacy is a double-edged sword, especially when it 
comes to health and safety. In fact, despite her general view that privacy 
is good, she states: 
[t]here is something comforting and efficient about [a] total 
absence of privacy for all. A person could identify his enemies, 
anticipate dangers stemming from other people, and make sure he 
was not cheated or manipulated. Criminality would cease, for 
detection would be certain, frustration probable, and punishment 
sure. The world would be safer, and as a result, the time and 
resources now spent on trying to protect ourselves against human 
dangers and misrepresentations could be directed to other 
things.95 
But although claiming that, with a “total absence of privacy,” the “world 
would be safer,” Gavison does concede that the subtraction of privacy 
would come at “much too high” a price.96 
Similar to Gavison’s recognition that privacy may, in some ways, be 
inimical to safety, Heidi R. Anderson argues against the recognition of 
privacy in public.97 She notes potential negative consequences of Westin’s 
                                                   
use of encryption software will allow criminals a sanctuary to exchange information necessary for the 
completion of illegal activities, . . . [n]ational security for government agencies, companies, and 
individuals actually requires strong encryption. Spies have admitted to ‘tapping in’ and collecting 
valuable information on U.S. companies–information that was then used to gain a competitive 
advantage. A report form the CSIS Task Force on Information Warfare and Security notes that ‘cyber 
terrorists could overload phone lines . . . disrupt air traffic control . . . scramble software used by 
major financial institutions, hospitals, and other emergency services . . . or sabotage the New York 
Stock Exchange.’ Related to information war, it would seem that national security requires strong 
encryption, multilevel firewalls, and automated detection of attacks.”). 
91. Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421 (1980). 
92. Id. at 442. 
93. Id. at 440 n.63. 
94. Id.  
95. Id. at 443 (internal footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 
96. Id.  
97. See Heidi R. Anderson, The Mythical Right to Obscurity: A Pragmatic Defense of No Privacy 
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latter two (and perhaps latter three) stages of privacy—those in which the 
individual claims a right to privacy despite engagement with the public 
sphere. Generally, Anderson’s position is that privacy is harmful to the 
public good where it would prevent exposure of truthful information.98 
Specifically, she argues against laws that forbid the recording of police 
officers, noting, for example, that a failure to shine a light on police 
brutality, might lead to more of it.99 
Illustrating the complex interplay between privacy and safety, 
Anderson notes that law enforcement’s argument against being recorded 
is also founded on claims of safety enhancement. While Anderson argues 
that police officers’ activities must be public in order to promote 
accountability and public safety, police officers reply that only by keeping 
their activities private can they effectively protect public safety: 
[P]olice officers and their supporters argue that the threat of 
constant surveillance and later distribution via the Internet is an 
unfair invasion of privacy that prevents [officers] from adequately 
doing their job. For example, officers may hesitate to take 
necessary action out of concern that a partial and possibly 
inaccurate video recording of that action will lead to the officers’ 
firing or to bad police work. This concern, in turn, threatens the 
officers’ reputation and public safety as a whole.100 
While her inquiry into the privacy-safety dynamic is thus quite specific, 
Anderson recognizes that privacy and safety are connected, and her 
discussion—like Gavison’s—reminds that the issue is not 
always  straightforward. 
As with Anderson and Gavison, Solove too recognizes that privacy is 
at times opposed to safety. In Conceptualizing Privacy, he writes that 
                                                   
in Public, 7 ISJLP 543 (2012). 
98. Id. 
99. Id. at 547–49. 
100. Id. at 547. In Nothing to Hide, Solove takes up in more detail the issue of privacy’s struggle 
against national security. Typically a strong defender of privacy, Solove argues that the contest 
between security and privacy is “skewed . . . too much to the security side.” See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, 
NOTHING TO HIDE, at vii (2011). We tend to agree with that conclusion, but we also tend to reject the 
frame that produced it. Solove describes the privacy-safety interplay as one where privacy gains 
commonly mean security losses. While Solove goes out of his way to disclaim the strongest form of 
this position—stating that while “[s]ecurity and privacy often clash, . . . there need not be a zero-sum 
tradeoff”—what he appears to mean is that security and privacy can coexist: that proper regulation of 
security programs can allow them to be effective without impinging too severely on privacy. Id. at 
207. Thus, in Solove’s view, “[t]here is a way to reconcile privacy and security: by placing security 
programs under oversight, limiting future uses of personal data, and ensuring that the programs are 
carried out in a balanced and controlled manner.” Id. But the very idea of “reconciling” privacy and 
security implies that they are countervailing-rather than synergistic-ideals. See id. at 5,207. 
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“[s]ociety’s commitment to privacy often entails restraining or even 
sacrificing interests of substantial importance, such as . . . efficient law 
enforcement.”101 In A Taxonomy of Privacy, Solove lists “security”—
along with free speech and efficient consumer transactions—as an interest 
to be balanced against privacy.102 
A more optimistic view of safety does appear elsewhere in Solove’s 
work, as he has written about the ways in which privacy can 
enhance  safety: 
Disclosure[103] can also threaten people’s security. For example, 
many people have good reason to keep their addresses secret, 
including victims of stalking and domestic abuse attempting to 
hide from those that threaten them, police officers and prosecutors 
fearing retaliation by criminals, celebrities desiring to avoid 
harassment by paparazzi, and doctors who perform abortions 
desiring to protect their family’s safety. People want to protect 
information that makes them vulnerable or that can be used by 
others to harm them physically, emotionally, financially, and 
reputationally. For example, in Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., a 
deranged man was obsessed with Amy Lynn Boyer. He purchased 
Boyer’s Social Security number and employment address from a 
database company called Docusearch. The man went to Boyer’s 
workplace and murdered her. The court concluded that “threats 
posed by stalking and identity theft lead us to conclude that the 
risk of criminal misconduct is sufficiently foreseeable so that an 
investigator has a duty to exercise reasonable care in disclosing a 
third person’s personal information to a client.”104 
Our point is thus not that Solove—or any other scholar—fails to see 
the connection between privacy and safety. Solove in fact lists some of 
the same safety benefits of privacy as we do below, noting that privacy 
can protect physical, emotional, financial, and reputational safety.105 But 
in the context of a lengthy and careful analysis of privacy harms, there is 
very little express discussion of how the absence of privacy can put safety 
at risk or how strong privacy protections can enhance safety. We therefore 
                                                   
101. Solove, supra note 12, at 1093–94. 
102. Solove, supra note 11, at 480. 
103. Solove defines “disclosure”–a subset of the dissemination harm that he identifies as one of the 
four general types of privacy harm–as “the revelation of truthful information about a person that 
impacts the way others judge her character.” Id. at 491. This is in contrast to “breach of 
confidentiality,” which he defines as “breaking a promise to keep a person’s information 
confidential,” and “exposure,” defined as “revealing another’s nudity, grief, or bodily functions.” Id.  
104. Id. at 477, 532–33 (citing Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001, 1005–06, 1008 (N.H. 
2003)) (internal footnote omitted). 
105. Id. at 532–33. 
08 Froomkin.docx (Do Not Delete) 4/28/20  6:42 PM 
2020] PRIVACY AS SAFETY 163 
 
seek to establish that the relationship between privacy and safety does not 
receive the attention it deserves, and that even when scholars focus on it, 
they sometimes see the relationship as containing substantial 
contradictions and conflicts. 
 
As suggested above, for scholars who believe that privacy has inherent, 
non-instrumental value, there is little call to address the ways in which 
privacy might enhance safety. And we do not seek in any way to criticize 
that view. Rather, we invoke these examples to explain why it is that even 
the most thoughtful and careful analyses of privacy commonly fail to 
address its safety-enhancing aspects.106 We suggest that discussions of the 
value of privacy will be enhanced by redressing this imbalance. 
III. PRIVACY AS SAFETY IN PRACTICE 
Privacy enhances safety in several broad and overlapping ways: (1) it 
makes one physically safer; (2) it provides psychological security; (3) it 
makes one economically safer (and protects from some forms of invidious 
discrimination); and (4) it makes the exercise of various political 
rights  safer.107 
Our goal in this Part is to persuade the reader not only that in many 
cases privacy enhances safety (and that its absence can be dangerous), but 
also that in many cases U.S. law already recognizes and protects privacy 
in order to protect the safety of individuals in a wide variety 
of  circumstances. 
Our somewhat eclectic examples cut across all of the Typology’s four 
zones of privacy. Even though we believe that our examples do not fit 
perfectly into the Typology, in what follows we refer to it often in order to 
order to connect (and sometimes contrast) our project to the Typology’s 
state-of-the-art categorizations. 
A. Bodily and Locational Privacy 
The freedom from bodily threats is the most fundamental and personal 
form of safety. Bodily privacy relates to an individual’s interest in his or 
her own physical body. A person’s ability to control bodily privacy is 
directly related to that person’s ability to control interactions with their 
                                                   
106. See, for example, the works cited in note 15, supra, which identify privacy’s core value as 
related to autonomy and self-development but do not engage substantially with the interplay of 
privacy and safety.  
107. Arguably, by reducing stress caused by surveillance and other invasions of privacy, it also 
makes one safer from illness, but we do not explore that in this Article. 
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environment and with other people.108 The key concerns include the 
ability to exclude unwanted physical contact and to restrict information 
about an individual’s body.109 
 
If Alice wishes to harm Bob, she must first find him. Locational 
privacy, also redundantly known as “geolocational privacy,” is the ability 
to keep secret where one is.110 Locational privacy is thus a strong protector 
against all sorts of real and potential dangers to physical safety, making it 
one of the most powerful types of freedom from harm. The most extreme 
example of the value of location data comes from the U.S. Air Force, 
which boasted that the day after a militant posted a selfie posing in front 
of a command post, the Air Force used the geolocation data embedded in 
the digital file to send out drones with missiles to destroy the entire 
complex.111 The shoe was on the other foot when researchers revealed that 
cumulative data from Strava, a fitness app, could be used to create usage 
‘heat maps’ that disclosed the location of U.S. military bases.112 
According to Nathan Ruser, the maps pointed to likely “US military 
forward operating bases in Afghanistan, Turkish military patrols in Syria, 
and a possible guard patrol in the Russian operating area of Syria.”113 To 
make matters worse, when the Strava app first attempted to allow users to 
mark sensitive spots as private, the result often was to make them stand 
out instead.114 Other fitness apps have been shown to be 
similarly  revealing.115 
                                                   
108. Koops et al, supra note 13, at 567. 
109. Id. at 498, 567. 
110. See, e.g., Andrew J. Blumberg & Peter Eckersley, On Locational Privacy, and How to Avoid 
Losing it Forever, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Aug. 3, 2009), http://www.eff.org/wp/locational-privacy 
[https://perma.cc/4Q2Y-ARJV] (providing a definition of location privacy); see generally Marketa 
Trimble, The Future of Cybertravel: Legal Implications of the Evasion of Geolocation, 22 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 567 (2012) (discussing hiding one’s location in order to bypass or 
make ineffective attempts to partition the Internet geographically). 
111. Walbert Castillo, U.S. Bombs ISIS Using Social Media Intel, CNN (June 5, 2015, 5:15 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2015/06/05/politics/air-force-isis-moron-twitter/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/UQA5-UH2B]. 
112. Jeremy Hsu, The Strava Heat Map and the End of Secrets, WIRED (Jan. 29, 2018), 
https://www.wired.com/story/strava-heat-map-military-bases-fitness-trackers-privacy/ 
[https://perma.cc/T2HL-8FZ4]. 
113. Id. 
114. Rob Pegoraro, The Strava Social Exercise App Can Reveal Your Home Address, YAHOO FIN. 
(Feb. 7, 2018), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/social-exercise-app-can-give-away-home-address-
182247535.html [https://perma.cc/PM5C-2KH9]. 
115. See, e.g., Maurits Martijn et al., This Fitness App Lets Anyone Find Names and Addresses for 
Thousands of Soldiers and Secret Agents, DE CORRESPONDENT, https://decorrespondent.nl/8480/this-
fitness-app-lets-anyone-find-names-and-addresses-for-thousands-of-soldiers-and-secret-
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As these incidents demonstrate, locational privacy’s value is that it 
allows one to regulate access to one’s body and one’s things.116 The 
examples below present a variety of illustrations of this fundamental 
principle, although the dangers they protect against are not in the main as 
dramatic as a deadly drone strike. 
Perhaps nowhere in law is the close link between privacy and physical 
safety more explicitly recognized and addressed than in the criminal 
justice system. As a system designed to identify, capture, convict, and 
incarcerate potentially dangerous people, the criminal-justice system 
requires the ability to safeguard both witnesses and members of the 
system itself from harms by suspects, defendants, convicts, and their 
associates. Depending on the nature of the perceived threat, the system 
achieves these goals by hiding personal information—and sometimes 
hiding people. 
1. Hiding People: Witness Protection 
Criminal trials in the United States are almost inevitably public. This 
can expose witnesses to personal risk. For obvious reasons, the defendant 
against whom the witness testifies may seek to intimidate the witness or 
make an example out of them to scare off other potential witnesses. 
Privacy—through, for example, witness-protection programs—is the 
shield for these witnesses, keeping them safe before, during, and 
after  trial.117 
Similarly, police safeguard the identity of confidential informants in 
order to protect them from retaliation.118 This qualified privilege also 
exists when the informant assisted in an undercover transaction,119 and 
despite various risks associated with the use of confidential informants.120 
                                                   
agents/260810880-cc840165 [https://perma.cc/CY46-4RVE] (describing how fitness app could be 
used to find locations, and often names and addresses, of soldiers and covert operatives). 
116. In terms of the Typology, we would put this in both the Personal Zone and also in the 
Proprietary Zone. 
117. See generally Raneta L. Mack, The Federal Witness Protection Program Revisited and 
Compared: Reshaping an Old Weapon to Meet New Challenges in the Global Crime Fighting Effort, 
21 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 191 (2013); Nora V. Demleitner, Witness Protection in Criminal 
Cases: Anonymity, Disguise or Other Options, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 641, 641 (1998) (noting the conflict 
between ensuring witnesses’ privacy and the U.S. Constitution’s Confrontation Clause). 
118. 21 AM. JUR. 2D CRIMINAL LAW § 1152 (2019) (“The prosecution in a criminal case is 
generally allowed to withhold from an accused the identity of an informer.”); California v. Ortiz, No. 
B158369, 2004 WL 2251202, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2004) (“The confidential informant’s 
anonymity is essential to his safety and well-being.”).  
119. 21 AM. JUR. 2D CRIMINAL LAW § 1152. 
120. See, e.g., ABA STANDARD FOR CRIM. JUST. Standard 2.4 (noting various risks that prosecutors 
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2. Hiding Information About People 
a. In Criminal Justice 
A broad form of privacy protection commonly applies to officials 
involved in law enforcement and the judiciary. The State of Florida, for 
example, has the broadest open-records policies in the United States121: as 
the Florida Supreme Court has noted, “[a]ll governmental entities in 
Florida are subject to the requirements of the Sunshine Law unless 
specifically exempted[,]”122 making Florida the “Sunshine State” in more 
ways than one. But even Florida has long made an exception to this right 
of public access, protecting certain particularly sensitive personal 
information, such as the home addresses of officials in law enforcement, 
the judiciary, and other public positions whose occupants might draw the 
ire of an angry and vengeful citizen.123 
Courts also recognize the importance of privacy for the safety of jurors 
in certain criminal cases. As part of the public’s right to see justice done, 
and of the right of the defendant to a public trial, courts ordinarily make 
the jurors’ identities public during or at the conclusion of a trial.124 In 
                                                   
should consider before relying on testimony of confidential informant). 
121. Sandra F. Chance & Christina Locke, The Government-in-the-Sunshine Law Then and Now: 
A Model for Implementing New Technologies Consistent with Florida’s Position as a Leader in Open 
Government, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 245, 245 (2008). 
122. Sarasota Citizens v. City of Sarasota, 48 So. 3d 755, 762 (Fla. 2010). 
123. Florida law exempts from disclosure public records pertaining to the “home addresses, 
telephone numbers, dates of birth, and photographs of active or former sworn law enforcement 
personnel or of active or former civilian personnel employed by a law enforcement agency” FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 119.071(4)(d)2.a (West 2019). The particular groups covered by the exemption are 
listed in the statute. See id. §§ (4)(d)2.c, l, m, r, t (providing similar protections (sometimes also 
including the place of employment) for other investigatory officials); id. § (4)(d)2.d (firefighters); id. 
§§ (4)(d)2.e, g, m (current and former justices of the Florida Supreme Court, (minus the bar on 
photographs, but also protecting the “places of employment of the spouses and children of current or 
former justices and judges; and the names and locations of schools and day care facilities attended by 
the children of current or former justices and judges”) magistrates, judges, administrative law judges, 
child-support hearing officers, and other adjudicators); id. §§ (4)(d)2.f, l (current or former state 
prosecutors and public defenders); id. §§ (4)(d)2.h–k, o (state and local personnel managers, code 
enforcers, guardians ad litem, probation officers and other workers in the prison system); id. 
§ (4)(d)2.q (EMTs and paramedics); id. § (4)(d)2.s (employees of addiction treatment facilities).  
124. Although practice varies, in most jurisdictions the identities of the jurors, which can be found 
in the court record, are presumed to be public. See Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public 
Records, Privacy and the Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1145 (2002). Thus, circumstances in 
which the jurors are impaneled anonymously or the nature of the matter leads the court to seal the 
records of the case are exceptions to general practice; see also Kevin Delaney, The Right of Access to 
Juror Names and Addresses, REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (Summer 
2016), https://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/news-media-law/news-media-and-law-
summer-2016/right-access-juror-names-an [https://perma.cc/74BA-8QC7]; see also, e.g., United 
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certain cases, however, courts keep the jurors’ personal information 
private in order to prevent jury tampering or reprisals.125 In other words, 
when necessary even strongly guarded principle of transparency of the 
trial process will bow to the safety needs of jurors and their privacy 
maintained even after the trial is over. 
b. Protection from Abusers 
The direct connection between locational privacy and physical safety 
is particularly clear in the context of domestic abuse and rape. There is a 
substantial body of scholarship demonstrating that when victims of 
stalking or domestic abuse regain control over their personal 
information—i.e., control over their informational and especially 
locational privacy—it protects their physical safety.126 “[B]attered women 
are at elevated risk of violence during the pendency of prosecution,”127 
leading reformers to suggest that police, prosecutors, and courts should 
help victims avoid being found by their abusers.128 On the other hand, it 
should also be noted that there is an important strand of scholarship that 
traced the law’s unwillingness to interfere in marital battering to a belief 
that this would intrude into the privacy of the home.129 
In fact, the Supreme Court has expressly recognized that privacy 
                                                   
States v. Wecht, 537 F.3d 222 (3d Cir. 2008); United States v. Doherty, 675 F. Supp. 719 (D. Mass. 
1987); Commonwealth v. Long, 922 A.2d 892, 905 (Pa. 2007) (holding that there is a qualified First 
Amendment right of access to juror names but not addresses); State ex rel. Beacon J. Publ’g Co. v. 
Bond, 781 N.E.2d 180 (Ohio 2002).  
125. See United States v. Blagojevich, 612 F.3d 558, 561 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Anonymous juries are 
permissible when the jurors’ safety would be jeopardized by public knowledge, or the defendant has 
attempted to bribe or intimidate witnesses or jurors.”); United States v. Eufrasio, 935 F.2d 553, 574 
(3d Cir. 1991) (“A trial court has discretion to permit an anonymous jury without holding an 
evidentiary hearing on juror safety, if the court believes there is potential for juror apprehension.”); 
Michigan v. Williams, 616 N.W.2d 710, 714 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (stating that anonymous juries 
should be used where “jurors’ safety” is an issue). 
126. See, e.g., Paul S. Haberman, Before Death, We Must Part: Relocation and Protection for 
Domestic Violence Victims in Volatile Divorce and Custody Situations, 43 FAM. CT. REV. 149, 159 
(2005) (proposing a model for relocation of abused spouses based upon the Federal Witness 
Protection Program). 
127. Barbara Hart, Battered Women and the Criminal Justice System, 36 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 
625, 631 (1993) (proposing that the criminal justice system help victims prevent abusers from locating 
them). 
128. See, e.g., Kimberly D. Bailey, It’s Complicated: Privacy and Domestic Violence, 49 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1777, 1813 (2012) (stating that privacy can provide domestic violence victims with 
more choices and “more of a voice about which solutions are appropriate for their particular 
situation”).  
129. See JEANNIE SUK, AT HOME IN THE LAW: HOW THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REVOLUTION IS 
TRANSFORMING PRIVACY (2009). 
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protects physical safety in this context, noting that publishing the names 
of rape victims may jeopardize their “physical safety,” as victims “may 
be targeted for retaliation if their names become known to 
their  assailants.”130 
c. Protection from Kidnappers 
Knowing where your target can be found is of obvious importance to 
potential kidnappers; the absence of locational privacy is what makes 
kidnapping possible. Kidnapping for profit is a major criminal market, 
with an estimated total turnover of up to U.S. $1.5 billion per year.131 
According to Gardaworld, a kidnap for ransom and maritime piracy risk 
mitigation service, most of the world is rated as “substantial,” “severe,” 
or “critical” risk for kidnapping or piracy, including Mexico and much of 
South America, most of Africa, India, China, and the former Soviet 
Union.132 Non-terrorist kidnappers for ransom target “foreign tourists, 
high-net-worth local residents insured by multinational insurers, and the 
employees of foreign enterprises,”133 but also domestic middle-class 
persons thought to have assets, and in Mexico even working-class 
individuals.134 The process is almost institutionalized, to the point where 
“in many established kidnap hotspots, ransoms are indeed surprisingly 
low and stable.”135 
In order to prevent kidnappers from deducing their locations, potential 
targets need to avoid being tracked, and need to avoid predictable patterns 
of movement such as taking the same route home every day. Locational 
                                                   
130. The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 537 (1989); see also Kimberly W. Bacon, Florida 
Sun v. B.J.F.: The Right of Privacy Collides with the First Amendment, 76 IOWA L. REV. 139, 154 
n.117 (1990). 
131. Anja Shortland, Governing Kidnap for Ransom: Lloyd’s as a “Private Regime”, 30 
GOVERNANCE 283, 284 (2017). 
132. Kidnap and Piracy Threat Forecast Map 2019, GARDAWORLD, https://www.garda.com/ 
kidnap-and-piracy-threat-forecast-map-2019 [https://perma.cc/EG2B-C9J9].  
133. Shortland, supra note 131, at 284. 
134. Sergio Ramos, Kidnapping Statistics in Mexico as of Feb 2014, HAVOSCOPE (Apr. 11, 2014), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20140807051843/http://www.havocscope.com/kidnapping-statistics-in-
mexico-as-of-feb-2014/ [https://perma.cc/QN9M-QXE3] (reporting that “69 percent of the victims 
were also considered to be non-affluent [including] . . . . middle class workers, shop owners students 
and mid-level professionals”); Ken Ellingwood, Fear of Kidnapping Grips Mexico, LA TIMES (Sept. 
1, 2008), http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-kidnap1-2008sep01-story.html [https://perma.cc/ 
9YMX-V82E] (reporting that half of kidnapping victims were middle-class and that “[t]here have 
been cases in which working-class families were ordered to pay as little as $500 to get a 
relative  back”). 
135. Shortland, supra note 131, at 285. 
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information is, however, a double-edged sword in kidnapping prevention: 
persons who fear they or their relatives may be targets may want all family 
members to carry wearable GPS devices so that rescuers can find them if 
they are snatched.136 This illustrates the fact that privacy need not be 
absolute to protect safety; rather, what matters is that a person be able to 
control who has access to information about themselves: in this case, 
where they are. 
d. Protection from Stalkers 
Similar issues arise when targets seek to avoid a stalker who is not 
seeking a kidnap, but rather seeks access (e.g., to a celebrity) or seeks 
intimidation or violence. The Internet often makes it easy for stalkers (and 
kidnappers) to obtain personal information about their potential 
victims.137 This can facilitate, or even cause, online or in-person 
stalking—and worse.138 
The Center for Disease Control reported, in 2010, that one in three 
women and one in four men had been victims of physical violence or 
stalking by an intimate partner.139 Furthermore, one in six women and 
5.2% of men in the United States reported experiencing “stalking 
victimization at some point during their lifetime in which they felt very 
fearful or believed that they or someone close to them would be harmed 
or killed.”140 An earlier study stated that about one quarter of stalking 
victims reported some form of cyberstalking also, such as email 
or  texting.141 
                                                   
136. Santiago Montenegro, Falling Kidnapping Rates and the Expansion of Mobile Phones in 
Colombia,  at 26 (Universidad de los Andes, Paper No. 12, 2009) (ISSN 1657-5334), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1544475 [https://perma.cc/7NHC-BL5U] 
(attributing fall in kidnappings to ability of victims to phone for help or be traced via cellphone); 
COGNIZANT,  KIDNAP  AND  RANSOM 
INSURANCE: AT AN INFLECTION POINT 10 (Oct. 2015), https://www.cognizant.com/whitepapers/Ki
dnap-and-Ransom-Insurance-At-an-Inflection-Point-codex1575.pdf [https://perma.cc/EB4R-8J9U] 
(noting use of wearables as means of foiling kidnappings). 
137. Cynthia Southworth, Jerry Finn, Shawndell Dawson, Cynthia Fraser & Sarah Tucker, Intimate 
Partner Violence, Technology, and Stalking, 13 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 842, 849 (Aug. 2007), 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1077801207302045 (noting that “[s]talkers are using . . . publicly available 
free Web sites and paid information brokers to obtain personal information”). 
138. Re “worse,” see infra section III.A.2.e.  
139. NAT'L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, NATIONAL 
INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY: 2010 SUMMARY REPORT 2 (Nov. 2011). 
140. Id. 
141. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 224527, STALKING 
VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES (Jan. 2009), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ovw/
legacy/2012/08/15/bjs-stalking-rpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/P3JS-RXN8].  
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Stalking can be combined with hacking personal devices or social 
media accounts in order to obtain, and sometimes publicize, personal data 
or intimate photos.142 New technology also facilitates stalking in a more 
direct but no less disturbing manner. In an Australian case an ex-boyfriend 
“allegedly weaponized simple technology and smartphone apps that 
allowed him to remotely stop and start her car, control the vehicle’s 
windows and track her constantly.”143 Next up, instead of having to follow 
in person, stalkers will use drones to follow their victims and photograph 
their every move.144 
e. Protection from Doxing and Swatting 
“Doxing” (or “doxxing”145) is the malicious acquisition and publication 
of non-public personal data about a target in the hopes that others will then 
use the information to harass or injure the target.146 This can have tragic 
results. In 1997, an anti-abortion activist named Neal Horsely published 
the so-called “Nuremberg Files”: a website listing names of 
approximately 200 abortion providers.147 The site listed the providers’ 
home addresses, phone numbers, and posted photos of them.148 In an 
unsubtle encouragement to violence, the website noted which providers 
were still working, which had been wounded, and which had been 
killed.149 Between 1993 and 2015, at least eight abortion providers were 
                                                   
142. Barbara McDonald, Privacy, Princesses, and Paparazzi, 50 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 205, 235 
(2005) (“[T]he publication of photographs, often taken in secret and while following a person 
continuously, either visibly or surreptitiously, add greatly to the subject’s feelings of intrusion.”). 
143. Reis Thebault, A Woman’s Stalker Used an App that Allowed Him to Stop, Start and Track 
Her Car, WASH. POST (Nov. 6, 2019, 8:40 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019
/11/06/womans-stalker-used-an-app-that-allowed-him-stop-start-track-her-car/ 
[https://perma.cc/FQC5-CQ37]. 
144. See A. Michael Froomkin & Zak Colangelo, Self-Defense Against Robots and Drones, 48 
CONN. L. REV. 1, 33 (2015) (suggesting that following someone with a drone could violate anti-
stalking laws or be a civil nuisance); Kristen M.J. Thomasen, Beyond Airspace Safety: A Feminist 
Perspective on Drone Privacy Regulation, 16 CAN. J.L. & TECH. 307, 323 (2018).  
145. Victoria McIntyre, “Do(x) You Really Want to Hurt Me?”: Adapting IIED as a Solution to 
Doxing by Reshaping Intent, 19 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 111, n.5 (2016) (“Doxing is 
sometimes referred to as doxxing.”). 
146. Id. at 113. 
147. David S. Cohen & Krysten Connon, Strikethrough (Fatality): The Origins of Online Stalking 
of Abortion Providers, SLATE (May 21, 2015, 3:38 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_p
olitics/jurisprudence/2015/05/neal_horsley_of_nuremberg_files_died_true_threats_case_reconsider
ed_by_supreme.html [https://perma.cc/N5K7-X7R4].  
148. Id.; see also Hatewatch, Anti-Abortion Extremist Neal Horsely Has Died, S. POVERTY L. CTR. 
(May 11, 2015), https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2015/05/11/anti-abortion-extremist-neal-
horsley-has-died [https://perma.cc/KR47-D9NR].  
149. Hatewatch, supra note 148; see also Horsley v. Feldt, 304 F.3d 1125, 1129 (11th Cir. 2002) 
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murdered by anti-abortion activists.150 
The harassment that follows doxing can be intense. After the 2013 
Boston Marathon bombing, individuals posting on Reddit and Twitter 
misidentified a number of suspects and published their personal 
information, including pictures, online.151 One falsely identified person—
a twenty-two-year-old named Sunil Tripathi—became the target of 
harassment and soon committed suicide.152 
In a particularly powerful example, the New York Times reported in 
2018 on the virtual disappearance of Dr. Christopher Filardi, an 
ornithologist who, in 2015, became the target of an Internet mob after his 
employer, the American Museum of Natural History, posted a photo of a 
rare male forest kingfisher that he had trapped in a net while doing 
zoological research in Guadalcanal.153 Word then got out that Dr. Filardi 
had not just photographed the bird, but had killed it for the museum, where 
he then served as the director of Pacific Programs.154 While Dr. Filardi 
worked in the field without Internet access, back home the Internet 
response, led by animal-rights activists, was savage vilification.155 As 
matters snowballed, hackers attempted to access Dr. Filardi’s Facebook 
account, which he then shut down; people also targeted his children’s 
accounts. Nighttime callers phoned death threats to his wife and 3,798 
people signed an online petition stating that “Chris Filardi is a disgrace 
                                                   
(noting that “on October 24, [1998], Horsley altered the Nuremberg Files website to graphically 
reflect which abortion providers had been wounded or killed; he did so by ‘graying-out’ the wounded 
and ‘striking-through’ the dead”). 
150. See Tara Murtha, How Abortion Providers are ‘Living in the Crosshairs’, ROLLING STONE 
(May 18, 2015, 4:03 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/how-abortion-
providers-are-living-in-the-crosshairs-34307/ [https://perma.cc/M9KP-79FY]. A 2015 New York 
Times article found that “[a]t least 11 people have been killed in attacks on abortion clinics in the 
United States since 1993,” but that number includes not just doctors, but also receptionists and a 
security guard, among others. See Liam Stack, A Brief History of Deadly Attacks on Abortion 
Providers, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/11/29/us/30abor
tion-clinic-violence.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2020).  
151. Dave Lee, Boston Bombing: How Internet Detectives Got It Very Wrong, BBC (Apr. 19, 
2013), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-22214511 [https://perma.cc/WQ5C-2GYA]. 
152. Traci G. Lee, The Real Story of Sunil Tripathi, the Boston Bomber Who Wasn’t, NBC NEWS 
(June 22, 2015), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/wrongly-accused-boston-bombing-
sunil-tripathys-story-now-being-told-n373141 [https://perma.cc/434E-CB42]; see also Nellie 
Bowles, How ‘Doxxing’ Became a Mainstream Tool in the Culture Wars, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/30/technology/doxxing-protests.html (last visited Mar. 
9,  2020).  
153. Kirk W. Johnson, The Ornithologist the Internet Called a Murderer, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/15/opinion/sunday/moustached-kingfisher-internet-
harassment.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2020). 
154. Id.  
155. Id. 
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and frankly does not deserve to breathe another breath.”156 When Dr. 
Filardi returned to work in New York, the police advised him to sneak in 
via a back door. When he published an essay defending his work, 
commentators called him a murderer.157 Eventually, Dr. Filardi changed 
his job, scrubbed his online profile, and made himself hard to find.158 
Most members of online mobs live far from their targets and thus they 
limit themselves to verbal abuse. Unfortunately, publication of personal 
locational information—whether self-published or the product of 
doxing—can lead to “swatting.” This occurs when someone calls the 
police and falsely reports that a hostage situation or other scenario calling 
for a SWAT team—i.e., heavily armed police—is taking place at the 
target’s home. The police then raid the home, an event that puts the 
unsuspecting inhabitants at risk.159 In one case, the Wichita Police SWAT 
team responded to a call reporting a hostage-taking and—in 
circumstances that remain opaque—shot and killed the target.160 While 
swatting commonly arises from private vendettas, victims include a 
prominent security researcher who angered an online doxer161 and, more 
recently, three separate events targeted survivors of the Marjory Stoneman 
Douglas high-school shooting, who had each become nationally 
recognized gun-control activists.162 
                                                   
156. Id. 
157. Id. 
158. See id. (describing the effort required to contact Dr. Filardi). 
159. Swatting, LEXICO OXFORD DICTIONARY, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/swatting 
[https://perma.cc/S929-XLUM] (“Swatting” is defined as “[t]he action or practice of making a hoax call to 
the emergency services in an attempt to bring about the dispatch of a large number of armed police officers 
to a particular address.”). 
160. Emanuella Grinberg, Shooting Death in Video Game Leads to a Real One in Kansas, CNN 
(Jan. 30, 2018, 7:24 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/30/us/kansas-swatting-death-
affidavit/index.html [https://perma.cc/7CZT-W9D5]. 
161. See Brian Krebs, The World Has No Room for Cowards, KREBSONSECURITY (Mar. 13, 2013, 
3:15 PM), https://krebsonsecurity.com/2013/03/the-world-has-no-room-for-cowards/ 
[https://perma.cc/6EUG-GPBN] (describing a SWATing incident at his home); Brian Krebs, 
SWATing Incidents Tied to ID Theft?, KREBSONSECURITY (Apr. 13, 2013, 4:47 PM), https://krebso
nsecurity.com/2013/04/swatting-incidents-tied-to-id-theft-sites/ [https://perma.cc/YVS6-D29G] 
(describing research identifying possible culprit); Brian Krebs, Serial Swatter, Stalker and Doxer Mir 
Islam Gets Just 1 Year in Jail, KREBSONSECURITY (July 16, 2016, 8:32 PM), https://krebsonsecurit
y.com/2016/07/serial-swatter-stalker-and-doxer-mir-islam-gets-just-1-year-in-jail/ 
[https://perma.cc/728Z-2X3P] (reporting on trial of person partly responsible for SWATing Krebs). 
162. Erika Pesantes, Swatting Hoax Targets #NeverAgain Activists, SUN SENTINEL (June 8, 2018, 
9:45 AM), http://www.sun-sentinel.com/local/broward/parkland/florida-school-shooting/fl-sb-
swatting-hogg-kasky-20180608-story.html [https://perma.cc/C8MH-PXJM] (reporting swatting 
attack on David Hogg and Cameron Kasky, and noting the presence of family members in Kasky’s 
home); Jeff Tavss & Alex Finnie, Family of Stoneman Douglas Student Advocate David Hogg 
‘Swatted’ at Home, ABC NEWS 10 (June 5, 2018, 6:13 PM), https://web.archive.org/web/20190331
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Most recently, parents of children who survived the December 2012 
Sandy Hook elementary-school massacre issued an open letter describing 
the attacks they suffered after the tragedy: 
Conspiracy groups and anti-government provocateurs began 
making claims on Facebook that the massacre was a hoax, that 
the murdered were so-called “crisis actors” and that their 
audience should rise up to “find out the truth” about our families. 
These claims and calls to action spread across Facebook like 
wildfire and, despite our pleas, were protected by Facebook. 
. . . .  
We have endured online, telephone, and in-person harassment, 
abuse, and death threats. In fact, one of the abusers was sentenced 
to jail for credible death threats that she admitted in court she had 
uttered because she believed in online content created by these 
“fringe groups”. [Sic] In order to protect ourselves and our 
surviving children, we have had to relocate numerous times. 
These groups use social media, including Facebook, to “hunt” us, 
posting our home address and videos of our house online. We are 
currently living in hiding.163 
When telephone books were the main means for ordinary people to find 
out where others lived, anyone wishing to could ask the telephone 
company to keep them out of the book by paying a small fee for an 
unpublished or even unlisted (not available via directory assistance) 
number.164 Between the Internet and modern consumer data bases, hiding 
one’s home address nowadays has become nearly impossible. As a result, 
anyone who has the misfortune to become an involuntary public figure is 
at risk.165 
                                                   
133339/https://www.local10.com/news/parkland-school-shooting/family-of-stoneman-douglas-
advocate-david-hogg-swatted-at-home [https://perma.cc/5UPB-QP7A] (noting there were no 
casualties in the David Hogg incident as the house was empty at the time); Sharon Aron Baron, Police 
Respond to Threat Against Parkland Activist and Bomb Scare at Walmart, CORAL SPRINGS TALK 
(June 11, 2018), http://coralspringstalk.com/police-respond-to-threat-against-19571-19571 
[https://perma.cc/86DJ-SCPK] (reporting swatting incident targeting Sarah Chadwick). 
163. Leonard Pozner & Veronique De La Rosa, An Open Letter to Mark Zuckerberg: Our Child 
Died at Sandy Hook – Why Let Facebook Lies Hurt Us Even More?, THE GUARDIAN (July 25, 2018, 
6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jul/25/mark-zuckerberg-facebook-
sandy-hook-parents-open-letter [https://perma.cc/27LH-CQ5J]. 
164. See Peter F. Kriete, Caller ID and the Great Privacy Debate: Whose Phone Call is it, 
Anyway?, 97 DICK. L. REV. 357, 366 (1993). 
165. For example, after U.C. Berkeley law professor John Yoo appeared on a Fox News show and 
accused Lt. Col. Alexander Vindman of “espionage,” Vindman’s lawyer alleged that “LTC Vindman 
and his family have been forced to examine options, including potentially moving onto a military 
base, in order to ensure their physical security in the face of threats rooted in the falsehood that Fox 
News originated.” Letter from David Pressman, Bois Schiller Flexner LLP, to Lily Fu Claffee, 
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f. Protection of Beneficiaries of Good Fortune (Lottery Winners) 
Good fortune can also be a source of both physical and economic 
danger. The downside of good fortune emerges most starkly in the case of 
winners of large lottery payments. While winning the lottery may seem to 
be an occasion for celebration, it can also be the source of harassment and 
pain.166 State lotteries historically required that winners of large prizes 
agree to have their names and often photos publicized.167 The policy 
serves the twin goals of publicity for the lottery and transparency as to 
who is winning—the latter being designed to make it more difficult for 
insiders to manipulate the lottery results. In a break with this trend, several 
states now allow winners to be anonymous, or allow a period of 
anonymity,168 thus allowing winners to prepare for the tsunami of what a 
New Hampshire court called “solicitation and harassment.”169 
                                                   
Executive VP and General Counsel of Fox News, at 2–3 (Nov. 20, 2019), 
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6555531-VIndman-Boies-LETTER.html 
[https://perma.cc/9ZP3-FACA]. The U.S. Army issued a statement that it was providing “security 
assistance” to Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Vindman in order “to ensure that he and his family are 
properly protected.” Luis Martinez, Army Providing Security Assistance to Vindman, a Key 
Witness  in  Impeachment Hearings, ABC NEWS (Nov. 19, 2019, 11:51 AM), https://abcnews.go.co
m/Politics/army-providing-security-assistance-vindman-keywitnessimpeachment/story? 
id=67137282 [https://perma.cc/YTW4-NPH9].  
166. See Jen Doll, A Treasury of Terribly Sad Stories of Lotto Winners, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 30, 2012), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/03/terribly-sad-true-stories-lotto-winners/329903/ 
[https://perma.cc/4R92-5Q2A]. 
167. See Frank D. LoMonte, Who’s Willing to Bet That State Lotteries are Free of Manipulation?, WASH. 
POST (June 12, 2018, 3:05 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/whos-willing-to-bet-that-
state-lotteries-are-free-of-manipulation/2018/06/12/f9832e50-6dc0-11e8-afd5-
778aca903bbe_story.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2020). Of the states permitting some form of anonymity listed 
infra note 168, Kansas was the first to permit winners to remain anonymous. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-8720 
(2019); see also Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 246 (1991) (requiring no disclosure of winner’s identity without 
written  permission). 
168. David Pitt, Associated Press, Should Lottery Winners’ Names be Secret? States Debate Issue, 
BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 15, 2016), https://www.businessinsider.com/ap-should-lottery-winners-names-
be-secret-states-debate-issue-2016-1 [https://perma.cc/DPL4-NWKX] (“Delaware, Kansas, 
Maryland, North Dakota, Ohio and South Carolina allow winners to remain anonymous. A growing 
number of other states, including Colorado, Connecticut, Massachusetts and Vermont, will award 
prizes to a trust and allow a trustee–usually an attorney–to collect without disclosing the name of the 
ticket holder. States including Illinois and Oregon have made exceptions to their policy of disclosure 
when winners demonstrate a high risk of harm.”). More recently, Mississippi, North Carolina, and 
West Virginia have passed similar laws. See Mississippi, MISS. CODE ANN. § 27-115-43 (2018); 2018 
Miss. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 2 § 22 (no disclosure without written permission), North Carolina, N.C. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 18C-132 (2019) (winners of over $50 million may remain confidential for 90 days 
upon request); see also 2019 N.C. Sess. Laws 142 § 5;  West Virginia, W. VA. CODE § 29-22-15a 
(2018); 2018 W. Va. Acts 884. 
169. Jane Doe v. New Hampshire Lottery Comm’n, No. 226-2018-CV-00036, at 5–6 
(Hillsborough Sup.  Ct.  S.D.N.H.  Mar.  12, 2018),  https://www.courts.state.nh.us/caseinfo/pdf/civi
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Harms to lottery winners are surprisingly common. Lottery winners 
have, on several occasions, suffered from violence and extortion. In one 
case, a winner’s brother hired a hit man to kill him.170 In another case, a 
Florida man vanished three years after winning $31 million, only to be 
found under a concrete slab a few years later.171 One pair of Irish lottery 
winners went into hiding to escape extortion by an armed gang.172 With 
some regularity, winners are targets for theft and fraud.173 Even when 
there is no violence, winners face multiple demands for money from 
friends, relatives, and strangers; others, surprisingly, face various forms 
of contempt or mockery.174 
B. Intellectual Privacy 
Intellectual privacy comprises a person’s interest in the privacy of his 
or her personal thoughts, opinions, and beliefs. Protecting intellectual 
privacy ensures that one is free to be oneself—at least in one’s own 
mind.175 Whereas bodily privacy is concerned with the physical aspect of 
the individual, intellectual privacy is concerned with the mental, 
emotional, or spiritual aspects of the individual.176 Intellectual privacy is 
less tangible than some other privacy rights, and thus often is seen in 
conjunction with those other rights, like associational and decisional 
privacies.177 Although difficult to enforce as an independent right, the 
freedom to believe and think whatever a person wishes is fundamental to 
and a necessary condition of many of the other extant privacy rights. For 
example, there is a close connection between intellectual privacy and the 
freedom to express one’s beliefs or thoughts, which in turn has large 
implications for political freedom. 
                                                   
l/DoevNHLC/031218doevNHLC.pdf [https://perma.cc/AWW3-BJSG]. 
170. Doll, supra note 166. 
171. Abraham Shakespeare Won the Lottery, Then Lost it All, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Jan. 24, 2009), 
https://www.tampabay.com/news/From-the-archives-Abraham-Shakespeare-won-the-lottery-then-
lost-it-all_164452713/ [https://perma.cc/W728-WD7W]. 
172. Alan Murdoch, Lottery Winners Forced to Go Into Hiding After Extortion Attempts, THE 
INDEPENDENT (Apr. 16, 1994, 12:02 AM), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/lottery-winners-
forced-to-go-into-hiding-after-extortion-attempts-1370272.html [https://perma.cc/H5VT-CCB7]. 
173. Id. 
174. Doll, supra note 166 (describing “ugly” comments aimed at one winner by “lotto snobs” and 
at another winner for being supposedly too old to enjoy the winnings). 
175. NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY (2015); Koops et al., supra note 13, at 567. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. at 555. 
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1. Protection of Psychological Safety 
In addition to its value to physical safety, privacy—particularly 
intellectual privacy—helps create a zone of psychological safety. 
However, as with physical safety, the relationship between privacy and 
psychological wellbeing can be somewhat double-edged: too much 
privacy can become negative isolation and enforced privacy can be the 
product of ostracism or solitary confinement. Indeed, privacy only means 
something in relation to others—privacy was not a concern for Robinson 
Crusoe, but rather the opposite. While aware of these caveats, here we 
concentrate on the positive side of the relationship. 
There is now extensive evidence regarding the psychological costs of 
feeling threatened. For example, the stress of being stalked “can lead to 
severe depression, helplessness, and mental dysfunction.”178 In Winston v. 
Lee,179 the U.S. Supreme Court recognized what may seem obvious to 
many: that privacy contributes to making people feel safer from physical 
harm.180 The Court noted that intrusions such as the police entering a 
person’s living room,181 eavesdropping on someone’s telephone calls,182 
or forcing a person to accompany officers to the police station183 
“typically do not injure the physical person of the individual” but 
nonetheless “damage the individual’s sense of . . . security.”184 
2. Psychological Safety Under Pervasive Surveillance 
As facial recognition becomes ubiquitous, more intrusive surveillance 
is on the horizon and its psychological impact will be correspondingly 
greater. Today, stalking and individualized intimidation are in the main 
exceptional, not mass phenomena. Systemic tracing and retention of 
electronic communications is a mass phenomenon, but at least until 
recently it seems to have remained largely invisible to most people in the 
United States, Canada, and Europe. Similarly, while credit and other 
scoring systems are prevalent, their effects are concentrated in the 
economic sector. For a long time, credit scores were used primarily for 
                                                   
178. Brenda S. Sanford, Stalking is Now Illegal: Will a Paper Law Make a Difference?, 10 T.M. 
COOLEY L. REV. 409, 430 (1993) (quoting Rachel L. Jones, His Obsession, Her Terror, DETROIT 
FREE PRESS at 4H (Aug. 23, 1992)). 
179. 470 U.S. 753, 762 (1985). 
180. 470 U.S. 753, 762 (1985). 
181. Id. at 761–62 (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980)). 
182. Id. at 762 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)). 
183. Id. (citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979)). 
184.  Lee, 470 U.S. at 762. 
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credit determinations.185 More recently, landlords and employers have 
begun to use credit scores as inputs to their decision-making, and there 
have even been reports of dating applications matching by credit score.186 
Current levels of surveillance and control are only the beginning. Much 
greater surveillance is coming. The Chinese government may currently be 
the world leader in its experiment with social scoring mechanisms,187 but 
the use of “reputation mechanisms in law, regulations, and governance is 
not a uniquely Chinese phenomenon”; rather it “has been underway 
globally.”188 Privacy will achieve new salience when people begin to fear 
that every action they take both online and in person will be stored and 
scored. Whether everyone will react as if they were being stalked, or if 
mass observation and scoring will become a new normal, remains to 
be  seen. 
C. Protection of Spatial Privacy 
Spatial privacy involves a person’s interest in the privacy of particular 
physical locations, primarily those the person considers intimate.189 The 
most common examples would be the expectation of privacy a person has 
in his or her own room, office, or home. Spatial privacy focuses on 
excluding unwanted intrusion or inspection in an area a person identifies 
as theirs. Often, spatial privacy is associated with the intimate relations or 
family life that occur in the home, such as peeping in a bedroom 
window.190 The criminal procedure concept of a “reasonable expectation 
of privacy,” and the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable 
search and seizure, also originate from this privacy right.191 
                                                   
185. See Jonathan Weinberg, ‘Know Everything that can be Known About Everybody’: The Birth 
of the Credit Report, 63 VILL. L. REV. 431, 434–35 (2018). 
186. Online Dating Site Matches Users by Their Credit Score, CBSPHILLY (Apr. 5, 2017, 8:44 
AM), https://philadelphia.cbslocal.com/2017/04/05/dating-credit-score/ [https://perma.cc/FU3X-
QF9P]; see also Suzanne Wooley, Your Credit Score Could Make or Break Your Love Life, 
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 21, 2017, 2:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-08-21/a-
high-credit-score-can-make-you-look-sexy-on-dating-apps [https://perma.cc/PQ77-ZTAN] 
(reporting that financial responsibility “was ranked as a very or extremely important quality in a 
potential mate by 69 percent of the 2,000 online daters surveyed”). 
187. Xin Dai, Toward a Reputation State: The Social Credit System Project of China (June 10, 
2018) (on file with Ocean University of China and Peking University Law School), available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3193577 [https://perma.cc/3VMX-G7Q7]. 
188. Id. at 2; see also Lior J. Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an Era of Ubiquitous Personal 
Information, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1667 (2008). 
189. Koops et al., supra note 13, at 567.  
190. Id. at 500. 
191. Id. at 515–16. 
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D. Protection of Decisional Privacy 
Decisional privacy consists of a person’s interest in the privacy of 
personal decisions, primarily those relating to intimate relationships. 
Decisional privacy focuses on the idea that people should have the right 
to privacy regarding choices relating to sexuality, relationships, and 
family.192 While we are not prepared to make or defend the claim that 
reproductive autonomy is an aspect of “privacy” as such, some examples 
cited by scholars include the right to make uncoerced choices about sexual 
orientation, contraceptive use, and abortion.193 So understood, the value 
of decisional privacy is reflected in court decisions that protect family life 
and personal decisions from government intrusion; consider, for instance, 
Roe v. Wade,194 Griswold v. Connecticut,195 and the constitutionally 
guaranteed rights to a family’s privacy.196 
1. Avoidance of Shame (and Blackmail) 
Decisional privacy is reduced to the extent one is subject to external 
pressures such as shame or blackmail. One significant, although perhaps 
sometimes dubious, aspect of privacy is that it protects against the 
observation of actions that may cause shame. Society appears to be of two 
minds on this point. On the one hand, there are actions that are both 
shameful and criminal, and the protection of these is no virtue. Other, 
legal, activities may be immoral and embarrassing or have painful 
consequences if discovered; for instance, having an affair that might cause 
a divorce if discovered. However, there is also a substantial class of 
(usually legal) actions that some or all people may find shameful to have 
observed, and for which society either tolerates or even supports the 
average person’s desire to not have those actions observed. Examples of 
legal but don’t-flaunt-it activities include sex (generally a public-order 
offense if done in public, but not in private) and defecation (which is why 
there commonly are doors on toilet stalls). Furthermore, there are still 
people who would not want their sexual orientation or religious or 
political beliefs to be known by others. 
In each of these cases, the Typology’s overlay of informational privacy 
reflects its role in protecting intimate aspects of privacy by guarding not 
                                                   
192. Id. at 567–68. 
193. Id. at 521. 
194. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
195. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
196. Koops et al., supra note 13, at 521. 
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just against shame, a potentially painful emotion,197 but perhaps also 
against blackmail. The more surveillance people are subject to, the more 
they will either have to conform their behavior to social norms198 or the 
more they will have to risk either shame or demand for hush money. 
E. Protection of Communicational Privacy 
Communicational privacy involves a person’s interest in restricting 
unwanted access to their communication with other individuals. 
Communicational privacy includes the protection of speech, documents, 
phone calls, and electronic communications such as emails or text 
messages.199 In U.S. law, this privacy interest finds its most evident 
expression in the First Amendment’s protections of speech, religious 
liberty, and the freedom of association, but, as described in this section, it 
is also reflected in other doctrines and practices. Which zone of privacy 
these communications protections fall into under the Typology ranges 
from the intimate to the public zones, depending on the correspondent, the 
subject, and the context.200 
Governments today are increasingly regulating communications 
technology to require both traceability of communications and storage of 
metadata and even content by information intermediaries.201 The 
consequence is that any user of email, web services, or cell phones must 
act as if they are being monitored. Worse, with data retention, the 
government’s monitoring need not be in real time, but can be applied 
retrospectively for months or years. The consequences are potentially 
severe, and can lead to political repression—or self-censorship.202 This is 
not controversial: in Bartnicki v. Vopper,203 for example, both the majority 
and the dissent agreed that “privacy of communication is essential if 
                                                   
197. See June P. Tangney, The Self-Conscious Emotions: Shame, Guilt, Embarrassment and Pride 
in HANDBOOK OF COGNITION AND EMOTION 541 (Tim Dalgleish & Mick J. Power, eds., 2005); Jerry 
Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1212–18, 1260 
(1998) (noting that informational privacy helps individuals avoid the embarrassment that 
accompanies the disclosure of certain personal details). 
198. See Margot Kaminsky & Shane Witnov, The Conforming Effect: First Amendment 
Implications of Surveillance, Beyond Chilling Speech, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 465, 518 (2015). 
199. Koops et al., supra note 13, at 524, 567. 
200. We address evidentiary privileges below in section III.H. As noted there, many evidentiary 
privileges, such as the clergy-penitent privilege, can be characterized as protecting communications 
in the Typology’s semi-private zone. 
201. See, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, Lessons Learned Too Well: Anonymity in a Time of 
Surveillance, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 95, 97 (2017). 
202. See Kaminsky & Witnov, supra note 198, at 518. 
203. 532 U.S. 514 (2001). 
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[democratic] citizens are to think and act creatively and constructively” 
because fear of being monitored can inhibit the willingness to voice 
critical ideas.204 
1. Shield Laws 
The proliferation of shield laws for journalists in most of the states in 
the United States demonstrates that legislatures understand how privacy 
both enhances safety in the semi-private zone, and enhances liberty 
more  generally. 
Shield laws respond to a problem caused by the clash between the value 
of a public informed by journalists able to rely on confidential sources and 
the legal system’s focus on acquiring information relating to legal 
violations. “The United States public consistently relies on press coverage 
of leaked material to hold government actors accountable for 
controversial operations.”205 Yet despite the strong protections of the First 
Amendment, when it comes to being required to testify in court, or before 
grand juries, reporters have no more right to refuse than any other 
citizen.206 Consequently, at common law, it was not improper for a 
prosecutor to attempt to require a journalist to disclose a source who had 
revealed information about a crime, although journalistic ethics required 
that reporters nonetheless protect their sources, even at pain of being jailed 
for contempt for their failure to testify.207 
Thirty-one U.S. states have chosen to temper this rule with so-called 
“shield laws” that create a legal privilege for journalists.208 In seventeen 
                                                   
204. Id. at 533 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); id. at 543 (Rehnquist, C.J., 
dissenting) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). See generally RICHARDS, supra note 175. 
205. Elizabeth L. Robinson, Post-Sterling Developments: The Mootness of the Federal Reporter’s 
Privilege Debate, 95 N.C. L. REV. 1314, 1314 (2017). 
206. Romualdo P. Eclavea, Annotation, Privilege of Newsgatherer Against Disclosure of 
Confidential Sources or Information, 99 A.L.R. FED. 3D Art. 37 (2018) (“Traditionally, a 
newsgatherer, in the absence of a statute or court rule to the contrary, has no privilege to conceal and 
may be compelled to disclose in a legal proceeding before a court, grand jury, or other governmental 
bodies, the confidential information or the identity of a confidential source of information obtained 
by him in his professional capacity.”). 
207. Joel G. Weinberg, Supporting the First Amendment: A National Reporter’s Shield Law, 31 
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 149, 156–58 (2006). 
208. Id. at 173. The U.S. Justice Department also has special guidelines requiring personal 
authorization from the Attorney General to subpoena a reporter. The guidelines state that such 
subpoenas should only be authorized after “all reasonable alternative attempts have been made to 
obtain the information from alternative sources[,]” and the Department has attempted to negotiate 
with the journalist. 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (2019). The guidelines, however, are only advisory, not binding. 
See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707 n.41 (1972) (noting that guidelines need not be followed 
in all cases). 
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other states, the courts have judicially created a qualified privilege 
allowing reporters to protect their sources.209 While these rules vary, and 
do not apply to federal investigations and prosecutions, 
[i]n almost all the jurisdictions, the reporter’s privilege applies in 
the grand jury context. Over half of the state shield statutes render 
absolute a reporter’s privilege not to disclose confidential 
sources, and in virtually all of the remaining state statutes, the 
standard for piercing the reporter’s privilege is high, requiring 
more than simple relevance to the proceeding. State shield laws 
provide varying scopes of protection. In fourteen States, the 
state’s highest court or an intermediate appellate court has 
recognized a reporter’s privilege. Lower courts in three States 
have recognized a reporter’s privilege. Only Wyoming and 
Hawaii have not adopted some form of reporter’s privilege.210 
Because “[r]eporters cannot function without confidential sources,”211 
and because the public has an interest in the free flow of information, U.S. 
state authorities—and in a much more limited fashion, federal ones 
too212—have recognized the importance of protecting the identity of those 
sources. Here, privacy serves the security of the sources—and, arguably, 
the long-run security of all participants in democracy who otherwise 
would have to subsist on an information diet even more tightly controlled 
by governmental authorities. 
The reporter’s privilege to protect confidential sources is now anchored 
in international law. In 2011, the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee adopted an interpretation of freedom of expression that 
included a journalistic privilege, as recognized in Article 19 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.213 Prior to this 
                                                   
209. See Weinberg, supra note 207, at 173–75. 
210. Id. (emphasis omitted). Hawaii subsequently enacted a shield law, but it lapsed in 2013. See 
Jack Komperda, Hawaii Shield Law Will Expire After Lawmakers Unable to Reconcile Competing 
Bills, REPS. COMMITTEE  FREEDOM  PRESS (May 3, 2013), https://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-
resources/news/hawaii-shield-law-will-expire-after-lawmakers-unable-reconcile-compe 
[https://perma.cc/HH7K-FW7F]. 
211.  Scott Neinas, A Skinny Shield Is Better: Why Congress Should Propose A Federal Reporters' 
Shield Statute That Narrowly Defines Journalists, 40 U. TOL. L. REV. 225, 227 (2008). 
212. The U.S. Supreme Court has not recognized a reporter’s privilege, with its only relevant 
pronouncement being the somewhat opaque result in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690 (1972), 
which held that journalists, like other citizens, have no immunity from grand-jury subpoenas. Id. 
However, “[m]ost federal circuits recognize a qualified journalist’s privilege not to identify a 
confidential source.” David Abramowicz, Calculating the Public Interest in Protecting Journalists’ 
Confidential Sources, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1949, 1949 (2008). 
213. U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM., INT’L COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, gen. cmt. 
34, para. 45 (Nov. 29, 2011); see generally Edward L. Carter, “Not to Disclose Information Sources”: 
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pronouncement, the European Court of Human Rights (on multiple 
occasions), the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia, and the Special Court for Sierra Leone had 
each recognized some form of reporters’ privilege.214 
2. Protection of Whistleblowers 
In order to encourage people to report fraud and other violations of 
trust, U.S. law provides for a number of protections designed to safeguard 
the identity of informants known as whistleblowers. U.S. law also 
contains a large number of statutory prohibitions of retaliation against 
whistleblowers, for example prohibitions on firing an employee who 
reported an offense,215 but, necessarily, those only apply if the person 
retaliating knows the identity of the whistleblower. These rules, like those 
protecting witnesses and informants in criminal cases, are designed to 
encourage the reporting of misdeeds by those with knowledge of the same 
while at the same time protecting the whistleblower from the danger of 
physical or economic retaliation.216 A whistleblower protection scheme 
figured prominently in the revelation of the Ukraine scandal that set off a 
presidential impeachment investigation in October 2019.217 
The clearest example of a statutory anti-retaliation policy may be the 
Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) program to encourage and 
reward whistleblowing. Pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act,218 the SEC 
                                                   
Journalistic Privilege Under Article 19 of ICCPR, 22 COMM. L. & POL’Y 399 (2017). 
214. See Carter, supra note 213. 
215. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012). 
216. See Whistleblower 10949-13W v. Comm’r, 107 T.C.M. (CCH) 1475, 1475 (2014) 
(“Proceeding anonymously is necessary to protect the whistleblower’s professional reputation, 
economic interests and personal safety.”); Anonymous v. Comm’r, 127 T.C. 89, 94 (2006) (holding 
that risk of “severe physical harm” to taxpayer and taxpayer’s family outweighed general public 
interest in knowing taxpayer’s identity); U.S. Navy-Marine Corps. Court of Military Review v. 
Carlucci, 26 M.J. 328, 335 n.9 (C.M.A. 1988) (recognizing “the importance of encouraging and 
protecting whistleblowers” through preserving their anonymity); see generally U.S. Tax Ct. R. 345 
(“A petitioner in a whistleblower action may move the Court for permission to proceed anonymously, 
if appropriate.”); 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1 (West 2019) (requiring the audit committees of issuers of 
securities to implement internal procedures that facilitate and encourage “anonymous” 
whistleblowing by employees about “questionable accounting or auditing matters”). 
217. See Annie Karni & Nicholas Fandos, Legal Team Says it Represents a Second Whistle-Blower 
Over Trump and Ukraine, N.Y. TIMES (last updated Oct. 11, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/06/us/politics/second-whistleblower-trump-ukraine.html (last 
visited Mar. 9, 2020); Michael D. Shear, Highlights: Whistle-
Blower Complaint Goes to House as  Ukraine Phone Call Gets Released, N.Y. TIMES (last updated 
Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/25/us/politics/trump-impeachment.html (last 
visited Mar. 9, 2020).  
218. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 
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offers whistleblowers219 in the financial industry the prospect of monetary 
bounties220 and the promise of confidentiality.221 Subject to limited 
exceptions,222 whistleblowers may require the SEC to protect their 
identity, and even keep confidential the information that the 
whistleblower reveals if such information can reasonably be expected to 
reveal the identity of a whistleblower if made public.223 As one 
commentator put it, “[t]his is a very important protection for prospective 
whistleblowers” because otherwise not only their current job, but also 
their standing in their community and their future employment prospects, 
could be “ruined”—making the promise of confidentiality “more 
important than the monetary reward.”224 
Indeed, guaranteeing anonymity for whistleblowers 
allows individuals to come forward who would otherwise remain 
silent for fear of reprisals. In so doing it promotes the public 
welfare which may be subverted by abuses of power by 
government officials, or the public safety, which may be 
threatened by dangerous practices of private industry. It may also 
promote honesty and accountability among managers who know 
they will find it difficult to conceal their indulgences.225 
Partly as a result of keeping whistleblowers’ identities secret, the SEC’s 
program has been very successful: 
The SEC whistleblower program has proved to be popular with 
                                                   
1376, 1841–49 (2010). 
219. Exactly who should qualify as a protected “whistleblower” is a subject of debate. See Carmen 
Germaine, 9th Circ. Says Dodd-Frank Protects Non-SEC Whistleblowers, LAW360 (Mar. 8, 2017, 
3:17 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/899680/9th-circ-says-dodd-frank-protects-non-sec-
whistleblowers [https://perma.cc/CQU7-QDCS]. But the issue need not detain us here. 
220. Alexander Hall, Whistling Different Tunes: A Comprehensive Look at The Future of 
Whistleblowers under Dodd-Frank, 86 UMKC L. REV. 681, 685 (2018). In order to be eligible for 
bounties, the information given to the SEC must have come from the relator’s own knowledge, and 
not have been available from publicly available sources. Furthermore, the information has to be strong 
enough to substantially influence—or cause the agency staff to create—an investigation. See Ronald 
H. Filler & Jerry W. Markham, Whistleblowers—A Case Study in the Regulatory Cycle for Financial 
Services, 12 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 311, 314–15 (2018). 
221. Hall, supra note 220, at 686. The SEC’s rules also provide for protection against retaliation if 
the whistleblower’s identity is revealed. Id. at 686–87. 
222. See Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(2)(B)–(C) (2012) (primarily dealing with criminal 
referrals, for example, to a grand jury).  
223. Id. § 78u-6(h)(2); see also Hall, supra note 220, at 686. 
224. Hall, supra note 220, at 686. 
225. Frederick A. Elliston, Anonymity and Whistleblowing, 1 J. BUS. ETHICS 167, 172, 176 (1982) 
(“In many cases [whistleblowers] are fired or demoted, transferred to unattractive assignments or 
locales, ostracized by their peers and cast into psychological and professional isolation.” (emphasis 
omitted)). 
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tipsters. In fiscal year 2016, the SEC received over 4,200 
whistleblower tips, a forty percent increase over the first year of 
the program which began in 2012. By extrapolating these figures, 
it appears that the SEC has probably received over 10,000 tips 
since the implementation of its whistleblower program. By June 
2017, the SEC had awarded over $175 million in bounties to 
whistleblowers. Several of the SEC’s bounty payments were in 
the millions of dollars, including awards of $83 million, $30 
million, $22 million, $20 million, $17 million and $4 million.226 
If nothing else, this suggests that privacy as safety has real value. Indeed, 
the whistleblower program received a backhanded compliment from 
Republican appointees to the SEC who recently proposed to weaken it by 
lessening the awards offered to people who disclose major widespread 
frauds.227 
3. Encryption 
Cryptography, skillfully employed, prevents the interception of 
communications—shared secrets—by unauthorized third parties; it also 
protects recorded secrets, such as diaries.228 Both functions are key aspects 
of privacy.229 As Kim Lane Scheppele explains, 
Without the ability to keep secrets, individuals lose the capacity 
to distinguish themselves from others, to maintain independent 
lives, to be complete and autonomous persons . . . . This does not 
mean that a person actually has to keep secrets to be autonomous, 
just that she must possess the ability to do so. The ability to keep 
                                                   
226. Filler & Markham, supra note 220, at 315. 
227. Whistleblower Program Rules, 83 Fed. Reg. 34,702 (proposed July 20, 2018) (to be codified 
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249). The proposal increases the awards for disclosure of small retail fraud, but 
commentators (and the two dissenters in the three-to-two commission vote) described overall effect 
as designed to undermine the effectiveness of the program and potentially contrary to the enabling 
statute. See, e.g., Nicholas Piwonka, Proposed SEC Rule Will Hurt Whistleblower Program, 
WHISTLEBLOWER  PROTECTION  BLOG  (July 5, 2018), 
https://www.whistleblowersblog.org/2018/07/articles/dodd-frank-whistleblowers/proposed-sec-rule-
will-hurt-whistleblower-program/ [https://perma.cc/88CT-2WYY] (discussing how decreasing the 
potential size of a payout may disincentivize whistleblowers); Yves Smith, SEC Knifes Its 
Whistleblower Program,  NAKED  CAPITALISM  (July 9, 2018), 
https://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2018/07/sec-knifes-whistleblower-program.html 
[https://perma.cc/YB4Q-DVBG] (arguing that the amendments will severely undermine program by 
reducing incentive needed to persuade most potential whistleblowers to speak out). 
228. See BRUCE SCHNEIER, APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY (1994); A. Michael Froomkin, The 
Metaphor is the Key: Cryptography, the Clipper Chip, and the Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 709 
(1995). 
229. KIM L. SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS 302 (1988). 
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secrets implies the ability to disclose secrets selectively, and so 
the capacity for selective disclosure at one’s own discretion is 
important to individual autonomy as well.230 
Cryptography also enables strong electronic authentication, making 
impersonation and identity theft more difficult.231 With the help of 
intermediaries such as providers of Virtual Private Networks (VPN), 
cryptography also makes online tracking more difficult.232 
Thus, encryption can enable anonymous speech,233 and contributes to 
the freedom of association234 as well as to intellectual privacy.235 To the 
extent that cryptography helps mask a user’s location, there is also a link 
between communications privacy and physical privacy.236 
Currently, U.S. residents remain free to use cryptographic protections, 
despite a twenty-five-year on-again off-again campaign by law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies to enact limits on strong 
cryptography in order to enhance the government’s ability to acquire 
communications intelligence.237 Indeed, encryption is an increasingly 
                                                   
230. Id. (footnote omitted). 
231. See A. Michael Froomkin, The Essential Role of Trusted Third Parties in Electronic 
Commerce, 75 OR. L. REV. 49 (1996). 
232. A VPN prevents tracking by the user’s Internet service provider; unfortunately, many web-
based Internet activities still create vulnerabilities via more elaborate tracking and tracing 
technologies such as supercookies, see, for example, Nicholas 
Jackson,  The  Next  Online  Privacy  Battle:  Powerful Supercookies, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 18, 201
1), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2011/08/the-next-online-privacy-battle-
powerful-supercookies/243800/ [https://perma.cc/LP4R-M6YD] and online ‘fingerprinting’, see 
Electronic Frontier Foundation, Panopticlick, https://panopticlick.eff.org [https://perma.cc/FXJ7-
MBR4]. Phone-based internet activities also expose the user to any vulnerabilities introduced by the 
apps on their phones. 
233. See, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, Flood Control on the Information Ocean: Living with 
Anonymity, Digital Cash, and Distributed Databases, 15 U. PITT. J. L. & COM. 395 (1996) (explaining 
how encryption allows individuals to communicate anonymously over the internet); Froomkin, 
Anonymity, supra note 56 (explaining how encryption works and how, by enabling anonymously 
speech over the internet, encryption enhances freedom of speech). 
234. See infra section III.F. 
235. See supra section III.B. 
236. Koops et al, supra note 13 (noting that protection of informational privacy relating to personal 
data “is also a precondition to protecting the underlying physical privacy type”). 
237. See SUSAN LANDAU, LISTENING IN: CYBERSECURITY IN AN INSECURE AGE (2018); A. 
Michael Froomkin, It Came From Planet Clipper: The Battle Over Crytopgraphic Key “Escrow,” 
1996 U. CHI. L. F. 15 (1996); A. Michael Froomkin, From Anonymity to Identification, 1 J. REG. & 
SELF-REG. 121, 123–25, 129–31 (2015) [hereinafter Froomkin, From Anonymity]; Jim Baker, 
Rethinking Encryption, LAWFARE (Oct. 22, 2019), https://www.lawfareblog.com/rethinking-
encryption [https://perma.cc/26GG-QB3F]; Joseph Marks, The Cybersecurity 202: Attorney General 
Barr fires 
up the encryption debate (July 24, 2019), WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/pow
erpost/paloma/the-cybersecurity-202/2019/07/24/the-cybersecurity-202-attorney-general-barr-fires-
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standard part of information and communications technologies: it’s built 
into iPhones,238 web browsers,239 and is the default for popular 
web  pages.240 
F. Associational Privacy 
Associational privacy involves the freedom to choose with whom one 
wishes to interact.241 This form of privacy ordinarily involves multiple 
people; the right to associational privacy exists to guarantee social 
relationships outside the home, and the freedom of assembly.242 
Associational privacy can also refer to the expectation of privacy that 
groups have in protecting their information from outsiders, as well as the 
right to exclude people from their group.243 
U.S. courts have long recognized the connection between privacy and 
the constitutional right to free association, itself a cornerstone of the 
viability of a liberal democracy. In the course of litigation designed to 
prevent the NAACP from operating a chapter in Alabama, the Alabama 
state government obtained an ex parte order directing the NAACP to 
produce, inter alia, records containing the names and addresses of all of 
its Alabama members.244 In a unanimous opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court 
overturned the production order, noting that “immunity from state 
scrutiny of [the NAACP’s] membership lists which the Association 
claims on behalf of its members is here so related to the right of [the 
NAACP’s] members to pursue their lawful private interests privately and 
to associate freely with others in doing so as to come within the protection 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.”245 As the Court stated, 
It is hardly a novel perception that compelled disclosure of 
affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy may constitute as 
effective a restraint on freedom of association as the forms of 
                                                   
up-the-encryptiondebate/5d3789a388e0fa1454f7fea1/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2020). 
238. See Why Default iPhone Encryption Isn’t Enough, VIRTRU, https://www.virtru.com/blog/ 
iphone-encryption/ [https://perma.cc/5J6G-QNAY]. 
239. Adam Thompson, Browser Updates Round-Up: Continuing the Push for HTTPS Everywhere, 
HASHEDOUT (Oct. 8, 2019), https://www.thesslstore.com/blog/browser-updates-round-up-
continuing-the-push-for-https-everywhere/ [https://perma.cc/8W2U-63WF]. 
240. Id.; Lawrence E. Hecht, SSL Adoption Continues to Rise, THE NEW STACK (Apr. 14, 2018), 
https://thenewstack.io/ssl-adoption-continues-to-rise/ [https://perma.cc/J6VY-TLMS]. 
241. Koops et al., supra note 13, at 568. 
242. Id. at 572. 
243. Id. at 501. 
244. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 453 (1958). 
245. Id. at 466. 
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governmental action in the cases above were thought likely to 
produce upon the particular constitutional rights there involved. 
This Court has recognized the vital relationship between freedom 
to associate and privacy in one’s associations. 
 . . .  
Compelled disclosure of membership in an organization engaged 
in advocacy of particular beliefs is of the same order. Inviolability 
of privacy in group association may in many circumstances be 
indispensable to preservation of freedom of association, 
particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs.246 
Further, the Court held that freedom to associate with organizations 
dedicated to the “advancement of beliefs and ideas” is an inseparable part 
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.247 
Highlighting privacy’s tie to physical safety, two years later, in Bates 
v. City of Little Rock,248 the Supreme Court held that that disclosure of the 
NAACP’s local branch’s membership lists “would work a significant 
interference with the freedom of association of their members” because 
evidence indicated that identification of the members resulted in 
harassment and threats of bodily harm.249 
Just as the right to meet in private is protected by the First Amendment, 
so too is the right to speak (or write) anonymously. The Supreme Court 
has repeatedly noted the existence of a “profound national commitment to 
the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, 
and wide-open.”250 Political speech receives the highest constitutional 
protection because it “occupies the core of the protection afforded by the 
First Amendment.”251 The Supreme Court has consistently upheld the 
right of dissidents and others to speak anonymously when they have a 
credible fear of retaliation for what they say. Thus, the Supreme Court has 
struck down several statutes requiring public disclosure of the names of 
members of dissident groups.252 
                                                   
246. Id. at 462. The Court did not hold that membership lists were absolutely privileged from 
disclosure but emphasized that the State had failed to make a sufficient case that it needed the 
information. Id. at 466. 
247. Id. at 460. 
248. 361 U.S. 516 (1960). 
249. Id. at 523–24. 
250. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
251. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 346 (1995); see also Talley v. California, 
362 U.S. 60 (1960) (holding ordinance that prohibited distribution of anonymous handbills 
unconstitutional). 
252. See Brown v. Socialist Workers ‘74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 91 (1982) (holding that 
the “Constitution protects against the compelled disclosure of political associations”); Shelton v. 
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The tie between identity protection and safety remains a theme in more 
modern decisions protecting the right to anonymous political and religious 
speech.253 In Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. 
Village of Stratton254 the Supreme Court struck down a village ordinance 
requiring all door-to-door solicitors and canvassers—whether religious or 
commercial—to register with the village and to disclose their identities 
and the reason they wished to go door-to-door.255 The Watchtower Bible 
and Tract Society (known also as Jehovah’s Witnesses), a religious group 
that wished to go door-to-door in order to proselytize, challenged the 
ordinance as unconstitutional. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the 
“breadth and unprecedented nature of this regulation” meant that it 
violated the First Amendment: “Even if the interest in preventing fraud 
could adequately support the ordinance insofar as it applies to commercial 
transactions and the solicitation of funds, that interest provides no support 
for its application to petitioners [or] to political campaigns . . . .”256 
The ability to keep identifying information private when engaging in 
political activity—that is, the ability to communicate anonymously or 
pseudonymously—serves many ends.257 One of them is that it protects the 
speaker from retaliation, as activists can face threats and also 
actual  violence.258 
                                                   
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485–487 (1960) (holding invalid a statute that compelled teachers to disclose 
associational ties because it deprived them of their right of free association). 
253. Talley, 362 U.S. at 64–65 (“Persecuted groups and sects . . . have been able to criticize 
oppressive practices and laws either anonymously or not at all . . . due in part to the knowledge that 
exposure of the names of printers, writers[,] and distributors would lessen the circulation of literature 
critical of the government.”); see also Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. Village 
of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002); McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 342. 
254.  536 U.S. 150 (2002). 
255. Id. at 150. 
256. Id. at 168. 
257. See A. Michael Froomkin, Lessons Learned Too Well: Anonymity in a Time of Surveillance, 
59 ARIZ. L. REV. 95 (2017); Froomkin, From Anonymity, supra note 237; Froomkin, Anonymity, 
supra note 56. 
258. See, e.g., Chantal Da Silva, Florida School Shooting Survivors Receiving Death Threats Over 
Their Efforts To Tighten Gun Control, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 26, 2018), http://www.newsweek.com/flori
da-school-shooting-survivors-death-threats-819484 [https://perma.cc/38BB-4JK8] (discussing an 
activist who received death threats after campaigning for gun control measures). Relatedly, strong 
privacy protections are important to protect against oppressive governments. Repressive regimes 
often target dissidents who are then imprisoned, tortured, and sometimes killed. In Dep’t of State v. 
Ray, the Supreme Court held that the identities of certain Haitian emigrants must be kept private in 
part because of the risk that the Haitian government would retaliate and perhaps even inflict physical 
harm. 502 U.S. 164, 176–77 (1991) (“[D]isclosure of the unredacted interview summaries would 
publicly identify the interviewees as people who cooperated with a State Department investigation of 
the Haitian Government’s compliance with its promise to the United States Government not to 
prosecute the returnees . . . . How significant the danger of mistreatment may now be is, of course, 
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G. Protection of Proprietary Privacy—Physical and Virtual 
Proprietary privacy concerns the use of property to keep objects or 
information from others259: A purse conceals objects from others, as does 
keeping objects in the glove compartment of a car.260 Fourth Amendment 
law ordinarily controls when the government can pierce the concealment 
a person has put around an object or a conversation, and that law relies 
greatly on the nebulous and contextual concept of “reasonable 
expectations.” For example, U.S. law recognizes that when bringing a 
suitcase through the airport, its owner has an expectation of privacy 
relating to what is inside the luggage as against other travelers, but not as 
against airport security or customs agents legally authorized to inspect the 
luggage for dangerous materials or contraband.261 A surprising amount of 
private law relating to privacy tracks, or is influenced by, the expectations 
considered reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. For example, to 
make out a claim for the tort of unreasonable intrusion a plaintiff must 
demonstrate he or she had “an objectively reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the place, conversation, or activity upon which the defendant 
allegedly intruded.”262 
Traditionally, proprietary privacy related to things, tangible chattels. 
However, proprietary privacy increasingly relates to intangibles, data, 
virtual things. Privacy is obviously an essential component to the safety 
of any account secured by a password. Accounts, such as online bank 
accounts, may also be secured by requiring a user ID or even two-factor 
authentication.263 Failing to keep access credentials private exposes the 
account’s owner to financial or other fraud. 
Even those who use reasonable safeguards for their access credentials 
remain at risk of identity theft (ID theft), a form of fraud in which the 
attacker acquires the target’s credentials and then impersonates the target 
                                                   
impossible to measure, but the privacy interest in protecting these individuals from any retaliatory 
action that might result from a renewed interest in their aborted attempts to emigrate must be given 
great weight.”). 
259. Koops et al., supra note 13, at 567. 
260. Id. 
261. Id. at 518. 
262. Privacy, Technology, and the California “Anti-Paparazzi” Statute, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1367, 
1370 (1999) (citing Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 490 (Cal. 1998)). 
263. In two-factor authentication, the user must supply a second proof of authorization in addition 
to the user/password combination. Common examples include a hardware token such as a key fob, a 
code from an app on a cell phone, or keying in a code sent by email or text to a registered address or 
phone number. See What is 2FA?, SECURENVOY, https://www.securenvoy.com/two-factor-
authentication/what-is-2fa.shtm [https://perma.cc/5SNQ-9TS9].  
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to gain financial advantage. ID theft is commonly used to get access to 
bank accounts, income-tax refunds (real or fraudulently claimed), credit 
cards, and health care.264 The U.S. government gives thirteen pieces of 
advice to consumers about how to protect against ID theft. Of these, nine 
involve securing information or being more private, and four involve 
increased monitoring of credit reports and other information.265 
ID theft can have devastating effects on its victims. The consequences 
can be financial,266 leading to destroyed credit ratings and harassment by 
debt collectors.267 A common type of ID theft involves fraudulently filing 
a false tax return on behalf of another, claiming that a refund is due, and 
having it sent to the thief’s address. In 2014, the IRS may have paid out 
as much $3.1 billion in refund checks to victims of identity thieves.268 But 
that number pales before the Justice Department’s estimate that in the 
same year 17.6 million Americans older than sixteen had their personal 
information stolen, leading to total damages of $15.4 billion.269 
In particularly severe cases, the ID theft can be life-threatening, in one 
case even leading to the victim being implicated in—and publicly linked 
to—an international assassination. Nicole McCabe was an Australian 
woman living in Israel when she heard a radio broadcast implicating her 
in the alleged Mossad-led assassination of Mahmoud al-Mabhouh in a 
Dubai hotel room. McCabe had never been to Dubai— and she had her 
passport. But while her passport had not been physically stolen, the 
                                                   
264. Identity Theft, USA.GOV (last updated Nov. 27, 2019), https://www.usa.gov/identity-theft 
[https://perma.cc/6BGS-3DBN]. 
265. Id. The advice to check one’s credit reports has been criticized on the grounds that “making 
individuals responsible for protecting their identity and reputation by such means is akin to requiring 
them to leave their homes unlocked while suggesting they check with the local pawn shop to see if 
any of their things are fenced as stolen.” Shostack & Syverson, supra note 55, at 137. 
266. Id.  
267. For example, in the fall of 2012, Alice Lipski stole Helen Anderson’s financial mail, including 
old credit-card statements. Doug Shadel, ‘She Stole My Life’ – How Millions Fall Victim to Identity 
Theft, AARP THE MAGAZINE (Oct./Nov. 2014), https://www.aarp.org/money/scams-fraud/info-
2014/identity-theft-protection.html [https://perma.cc/UWM3-PKDJ]. Lipski then registered as 
Anderson for a credit-monitoring service intended to prevent ID theft—which exposed Anderson’s 
complete credit history, revealing numerous canceled and inactive credit cards. Id. Lipski then 
reported the cards as lost or stolen, got new cards and new online account information safeguarded 
by new usernames, passwords, and security questions. Id. Since Lipski set them up, Anderson was 
locked out of the accounts in her name. Id. Lipski then charged over $30,000 in Anderson’s name, 
and was only caught because she forgot her purse in a department store. Id. Inside were ten driver’s 
licenses—each with a different name, but all with Lipski’s picture. Id.  
268. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-508, IDENTITY THEFT AND TAX FRAUD: IRS 
NEEDS TO UPDATE ITS RISK ASSESSMENT FOR THE TAXPAYER PROTECTION PROGRAM 14 (2016). 
269. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, VICTIMS OF IDENTITY THEFT, 2014, 
at 7 (2015). 
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assassins had apparently forged a copy of it which contained all of her 
personal information and substituted the agent’s picture for hers.270 
McCabe reportedly stated that she was “‘terrified,’” had not slept, and was 
“worried for [her] health and . . . [her unborn] baby’s health.”271 
ID theft violates criminal laws in most states, and also federal law. The 
Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act makes it a federal crime to 
knowingly transfer or use, without lawful authority, “a means of 
identification of another person” intending to commit or assist “any 
unlawful activity that constitutes a violation of Federal law, or that 
constitutes a felony under any applicable State or local law.”272 
H. Privacy in Evidentiary Privileges 
U.S. law recognizes a host of evidentiary privileges. Although all 
evidentiary privileges support communications privacy, different 
privileges also support intimate, associational and, sometimes, 
public  privacy. 
Privileges prevent the acquisition or admission of potentially relevant 
testimony in service of other social policies. Thus, the right against self-
incrimination protects, among other things, the intellectual privacy of the 
suspect.273 The right also protects the physical safety of the suspect by 
making it illegal for officials to force confessions. 
The spousal privilege supports privacy in the Typology’s intimate zone. 
There are actually two spousal privileges. The first is a testimonial 
privilege that protects an individual from being forced to testify in 
criminal proceedings in which their spouse is a defendant.274 In some 
states, but not in the federal system, this testimonial privilege even allows 
                                                   
270. David Murray, ‘Assassin’ Nicole McCabe Alone and Scared in a World of Lies, Spies and 
Killers, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH (Feb. 26, 2010), https://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/assassin-nicole-
mccabe-alone-and-scared-in-a-world-of-lies-spies-and-killers/story-e6freuy9-1225834931178 
[https://perma.cc/3SDB-AR2G].  
271. Id. 
272. Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-318, 112 Stat. 3007 (Oct. 
30, 1998) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (2012)). In addition, the Theft Penalty Enhancement Act of 
2004, Pub. L. 108-275, 118 Stat. 831 (July 15, 2004) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1028A (2012)), 
increased penalties for “aggravated” identity theft, requiring courts to impose additional sentences of 
two years for general offenses and five years for terrorism related offenses. Id. And, the Identity Theft 
Enforcement and Restitution Act of 2008 amends 18 U.S.C. § 3663(b) (2012) to clarify that restitution 
orders for identity theft cases may include an amount equal to the value of the victim’s time spent 
remediating the actual or intended harm of the identity theft or aggravated identity theft.  
273. See generally NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY (2015). 
274. 2 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 5:39 (4th 
ed.  2013).  
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one spouse to prevent the other from testifying.275 The second privilege 
protects the contents of confidential communications between spouses 
during their marriage from testimonial disclosure; this privilege is 
narrower as it only applies to confidential communications, but when it 
exists it applies in both civil and criminal matters.276 
The long-recognized clergy-penitent privilege, under which priests and 
other religious figures do not have to disclose confessional 
communications from parishioners, supports both intellectual and 
associational privacy. The privilege exists to protect religious freedom 
and to foster and encourage spiritual relationships,277 but in the U.S. its 
reach has been reduced by laws in many states that require disclosure of 
child abuse.278 
Lawyer-client communications are generally privileged against 
disclosure in order to avoid discouraging people from seeking legal 
advice, but again the privilege is not absolute. Lawyers can disclose client 
information without the client’s permission in a small number of special 
circumstances such as if lawyer seeks to prevent a serious future harm to 
a third party.279 Even so, this privilege supports communications privacy, 
behavioral privacy, and even decisional privacy. 
1. Protection Against Invidious Discrimination 
The privacy that enables freedom from illegal discrimination also cuts 
across several of the zones set out in the Typology. It affects the public 
zone, since the search for employment, housing, or even credit is not 
exactly intimate. That said, once one is in possession of a house, that place 
and the human relations that take place in it might best be characterized 
as intimate; similarly, once one has the job, then the office and its 
relationships also might best be characterized semi-private. Arguably, 
since some forms of discrimination are race-based (although religion, age, 
                                                   
275. Id. 
276. Id. 
277. See Christine P. Bartholomew, Exorcising the Clergy Privilege, 103 VA. L. REV. 1015 (2017) 
(setting out the history of the privilege and then critiquing as largely unnecessary). 
278. See F. Robert Radel, II & Andrew A. Labbe, The Clergy-Penitent Privilege: An 
Overview, GROELLE & SALMON, http://www.gspalaw.com/the-clergy-penitent-privilege-an-
overview/ [https://perma.cc/DED3-6RU7].  
279. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (listing circumstances 
when attorney may disclose client information); see generally Chris Clark, Against Confidentiality? 
Privacy, Safety and the Public Good in Professional Communications, 6 J. SOC. WORK 117, 131 
(2006) (arguing that under a liberal rights theory approach, some measures of privacy protect 
autonomy of an individual but that professional obligations of confidentiality should sometimes give 
way to needs of wider public). 
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and national origin are also possibilities), one might consider the 
withholding of facts that may provoke discrimination to belong in the 
“bodily privacy” section of the Intimate Zone where Koops et al. place 
genetic privacy.280 
Most U.S. anti-discrimination laws penalize the use of certain known 
but “protected” information to make (primarily economic) decisions. 
Thus, for example, in the classic housing-discrimination story, the 
landlord knows or suspects the race of the applicant, which is what 
motivates the landlord’s refusal to rent an apartment to the individual. 
Prohibited discrimination is not primarily a privacy story—what 
motivates the discrimination is the absence of privacy: the economic actor 
knows a fact about the applicant or worker that society has decided is 
invidious if treated as a factor in decision-making. Of course, in many 
cases, especially in an ongoing employment relationship, masking the 
information that someone is a member of a protected class is not a 
practical option. But in the set of cases where the parties have yet to 
establish a face-to-face relationship, not divulging the personal 
characteristic at issue would be a solution to the discrimination problem 
since if the decider didn’t know, for example, the race of the applicant, 
and also could not infer it reliably,281 then perforce the decision would be 
race-neutral. 
U.S. federal statutes make it an offense for employers to discriminate 
on grounds of age,282 disability,283 genetic information,284 race or color,285 
                                                   
280. See Koops et al, supra note 13, at 569. 
281. When evaluating paper applications U.S. employers discriminate against applicants with 
African-American sounding names. See Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and 
Greg More Employable Than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market 
Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 991, 991 (2004) (finding “[w]hite names receive 50 percent more 
callbacks for interviews”). 
282. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602, 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-24 (2012)), forbids age discrimination in employment 
against qualified persons who are age forty or older. 
283. The Americans with Disabilities Act (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12100 et seq (2012) 
and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012), prohibit discrimination against qualified but 
disabled applicants in employment. 
284. Title II of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA), Pub. L. 110–233, 
122 Stat. 881 (codified at 42 U.S.C.§ 2000ff, et seq. (2012)), prohibits genetic information 
discrimination in employment.  
285. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (Title VII) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (2012)).  
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religion,286 national origin,287 sex,288 or pregnancy.289 Similar laws ban 
discrimination on grounds of race or color, national origin, religion, or 
gender in other important economic relationships such as housing,290 or 
access to credit.291 The formal structure of these rules requires the actors 
to ignore some feature of the applicant even though it may literally be 
staring the employer, landlord, or lender in the face: As many have noted, 
the dominant trope in US anti-discrimination law is a legally mandated 
‘blindness’ to certain facts.292 
The problem with most of these rules, however, is that they are hard to 
enforce since bias can be difficult to detect and even harder to prove. 
When possible, it is far more efficient to mask the information that might 
lead to discrimination. The effect of adding some privacy to hiring is 
potentially significant. When, for example, orchestras began to use a 
screen to hide the identity of players auditioning for places, the number of 
women hired increased 30% according to a study that looked at hiring 
patterns from 1970 to the 1990s.293 On the other hand, outside the context 
of economic relations, there can be circumstances in which masking 
information about a person’s race, gender, or sexual orientation can lead 
to the perpetuation of stereotypes and other unwanted results.294 
Many genetic characteristics other than race and gender that might lead 
                                                   
286. Id.  
287. Id. In addition, the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), Pub. L. 99-603, 100 
Stat. 3359 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.), makes it illegal for an employer to discriminate 
with respect to hiring, firing, or recruitment or referral for a fee, based upon an individual’s citizenship 
or immigration status.  
288. Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009) (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). 
289. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)) forbids discrimination based on pregnancy in any aspect of 
employment. 
290. The Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 3601–3619), forbids discrimination in all aspects of residential-real-estate-related transactions, 
such as buying, selling, or renting a home. 
291. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), Pub. L. 93-495, Title V, 88 Stat. 1500 (1974) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f), forbids credit discrimination on the basis of race, 
color, religion, national origin, sex, marital status, age, or whether a person receives income from a 
public assistance program. 
292. Robert C. Post, The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, in PREJUDICIAL 
APPEARANCES 1, 14 (Robert C. Post, ed. 2001) (citing Owen M. Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment 
Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 235 (1971)). 
293. See Claudia Goldin & Cecelia Rouse, Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of “Blind” 
Auditions on Female Musicians, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 715, 738 (2000). 
294. See Jerry Kang, Cyber-Race, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1140–45, 1167–69, 1183–84, 1201–02 
(2004). 
 
08 Froomkin.docx (Do Not Delete) 4/28/20  6:42 PM 
2020] PRIVACY AS SAFETY 195 
 
to genetic discrimination by employers, insurers, and others are not visible 
without some kind of testing. The U.S. Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act (GINA)295 currently protects workers against 
genetic discrimination in employment and insurance, but does not cover 
many other areas, notably college athletics296 and arguably schools 
more  generally.297 
The case that privacy enhances economic safety is easiest to make 
when the characteristics that might prompt invidious discrimination are 
not visible to the naked eye. Marital status, some ethnic origins, and many 
religious affiliations will not be visible to the observer, which is why we 
have rules forbidding lenders, employers, and landlords to ask questions 
about these characteristics. 
Similar arguments apply to a range of life choices (with, again, a range 
of visibility) that could become occasions for discrimination. Privacy 
protects the economically vulnerable from being targeted due to sexual 
orientation, associations, or a decision to terminate a pregnancy.298 
IV. PRIVACY GAPS 
New technologies create opportunities for surveillance and control. 
Enhancing privacy rights is one logical response to these threats. So, while 
above we surveyed examples of U.S. law seeking to protect safety by 
ensuring privacy, in this Part we offer examples of gaps in such 
protections: areas where safety is threatened by a lack of 
privacy  regulation. 
We identify and discuss three representative technologies—the Internet 
of Things (IoT), social media, and connected cars—each of which reduce 
                                                   
295. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-223, 122 Stat. 881 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). Cf. Bradley A. Areheart & 
Jessica L. Roberts, GINA, Big Data, and the Future of Employee Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. 710 (arguing 
that while GINA has failed to fulfill its purpose of improving attitudes toward genetic testing, it has 
achieved unanticipated success as an employee privacy statute). 
296. See Heather R. Quick, Privacy for Safety: The NCAA Sickle-Cell Trait Testing Policy and the 
Potential for Future Discrimination, 97 IOWA L. REV. 665, 669–70, 683–86 (2012) (critiquing NCAA 
legislation requiring Division I schools to require student-athletes to either undergo sickle-cell trait 
testing or release the school from liability on grounds that this will expose students to danger of 
subsequent genetic discrimination in employment). 
297. See Tyler Wood, Genetic Information Discrimination in Public Schools: A Common-Sense 
Exception, 49 U. PAC. L. REV. 309 (2018). 
298. Cf. Jean V. McHale & June Jones, Privacy, Confidentiality and Abortion Statistics: a Question 
of Public Interest?, 38(1) J. MED. ETHICS 31, 33 (2012) (“The need to maintain patient confidentiality, 
both for women who have had terminations and for those who will have in the future, is of course 
paramount to good healthcare. This is undoubtedly highly sensitive information.”). 
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personal privacy and thus expose people to new dangers. IoT and 
connected cars expose the user (and others within the home or the car) to 
surveillance and potential manipulation, or disclosure of intimate facts. 
With social media, people effectively spy on themselves, raising questions 
about what sort of regulation, if any, would protect their privacy, and thus 
their safety. 
Each of the technologies surveyed in this Part threaten to restrict 
behavioral privacy. Behavioral privacy consists of an individual’s 
freedom to move about without surveillance while in public. U.S. law 
tends to assume that the reasonable expectation of privacy in public is 
quite limited. Nevertheless, the law does regard as reasonable certain 
expectations of privacy while in public, such as not being stalked or 
invasively monitored.299 
Whether or not it is reasonable to expect a degree of privacy in public, 
cameras are increasingly ubiquitous, creating a risk that someone is 
recording any and perhaps all behavior outside the home. The rise of 
social media means that photos—and tagging—can happen anywhere.300 
Rapid improvement of facial recognition software creates the danger that 
images can cheaply and reliably be linked to identities. Also, as discussed 
below301 connected cars provide another avenue for tracking personal 
movement outside the home. Together these and other technologies risk 
substantially chilling the freedom of association, and behavioral privacy 
more generally.302 Meanwhile, a person’s online activities, especially but 
not only on social media, have a legal status little different from physically 
public activity, thus extending both public and private surveillance into 
the home. If and when social scoring303 becomes more common, the 
effects on behavioral privacy will only become more significant. 
A. Threats from the Internet of Things (IOT) 
The Internet of Things (IoT) is shorthand for to the ability of everyday 
objects to connect to the Internet and to send and receive data.304 Up to 
                                                   
299. Koops et al., supra note 13, at 568; see also supra section III.A.2.d (Protection from Stalkers). 
300. See infra section IV.C. 
301. See infra section IV.B. 
302. See Moritz Büchi et al., Chilling Effects of Profiling Activities: Mapping the Issues (Apr. 28, 
2019)  (unpublished  manuscript),  available  at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=3379275 [https://perma.cc/7HNJ-LYKQ] ; Kaminsky & Witnov, supra note 198. 
303. See Kaminsky & Witnov, supra note 198. 
304. FTC, THE INTERNET OF THINGS: PRIVACY & SECURITY IN A CONNECTED WORLD, 
at  i  (2015). 
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two billion IoT devices are in use around the world, with more to come.305 
Dangers from the proliferation of IoT devices are as varied as the devices 
themselves, and often invisible to the user. IoT devices can phone home 
to the manufacturer, they reveal information to third parties, and also may 
be vulnerable to hacking.306 “Light switches, cooking pans, stuffed 
animals, basketballs, headbands, water bottles, rectal thermometers, and 
more are now all connected to the Internet and our mobile devices.”307 As 
IoT devices seem set to permeate the home, work, and public spaces, they 
implicate all four of the Typology’s zones of privacy: personal, intimate, 
semi-private, and public. 
The enabling of unauthorized access to the devices creates dangers that 
the intruder will instruct the device to do something harmful, although the 
instruction and the harm depend on the device’s capabilities. Even though 
it is early days, it is reasonable to expect that, in the future, IoT devices 
also will create unpredictable new dangers because they are potentially 
long-lived, and thus will outlive their security model.308 
Domestic IoT devices range from juicers to condoms309 to voice-
activated digital assistants to home automation systems.310 IoT devices 
also proliferate well beyond the confines of the home, as we connect 
everything to the Internet and cloud storage. For example, smart cities rely 
on IoT-connected devices to enhance “environmental monitoring and 
analysis of data to prevent waste. For example, smart trashcans . . . use 
real-time data collection and alerts to trigger bin collection.”311 
One especially stark set of IoT-related physical dangers arises from 
                                                   
305. Sukhvir Notra et al., An Experimental Study of Security and Privacy Risks with Emerging 
Household Appliances, in 2014 IEEE CONFERENCE ON COMMUNICATIONS AND NETWORK SECURITY 
79 (2014). However, “breathless predictions of market [size] should be taken with a grain of salt.” 
Gilad Rosner & Erin Kenneally, Privacy and the Internet of Things: Emerging Frameworks for Policy 
and Design, in CENTER FOR LONG-TERM CYBERSECURITY WHITE PAPER SERIES 5 (June 7, 2018), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3320670 (last visited Mar. 9, 2020). 
306. “[M]any IoT devices have long-standing, widely-known software vulnerabilities that make 
them prone to exploit and control by remote attackers.” Nick Feamster, Mitigating the Increasing 
Risks of an Insecure Internet of Things, 16 COLO. TECH. L.J. 87, 88 (2017). 
307. Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, The Internet of Heirlooms and Disposable Things, 17 
N.C. J. L. & TECH. 581, 582. “Japanese security researchers have already hacked an IoToilet, giving 
them the ability to flush and squirt water at people.” Id. at 582–83. 
308. Id. at 581 (noting that objects, like coffee pots and dolls, can last long after the standard life-
cycle of software). 
309. See Stefan Ducich, These Walls Can Talk! Securing Digital Privacy in the Smart Home Under 
the Fourth Amendment, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 278, 280–81 (2018). 
310. Hillary Brill & Scott Jones, Little Things and Big Challenges: Information Privacy and the 
Internet of Things, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 1183, 1192 (2017). 
311. Id. at 1195 (giving example of “Big Belly Trash”). 
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medical devices, such as insulin pumps,312 pacemakers, and implantable 
cardiac defibrillators.313 Although as far as we are aware, as of this 
writing, there are no publicly reported incidents of an implanted medical 
device being hacked to harm the patient, the prospect prompted the recall 
of 500,000 pacemakers in 2017 alone.314 
Similarly, IoT devices in the body or in the home could be hacked to 
permit the acquisition and misuse of the owner’s personal information, 
creating risks to personal safety, which again will vary with what the 
device knows and can sense about the user. Information acquisition alone 
still poses personal dangers as some devices will know the user’s location 
while others will have credit-card or other financial data. Still others will 
allow an attacker to infer location. For example, devices with motion 
sensors and voice-activated smart-home devices will behave differently 
when persons are in the house, revealing location by inference. 
Even in the absence of malfunction or hacking, the makers of IoT 
devices may design them to permit the collection and then use of personal 
information, habits, locations, and physical conditions. In turn, this 
information might be used to make credit, insurance, and employment 
decisions,315 or, if acquired by the public sector, to make decisions about 
individuals’ dangerousness, or to follow up on suspicion of criminal 
actions.316 In 2017, VIZIO paid the Federal Trade Commission and the 
New Jersey Attorney General’s Office $2.2 million for installing software 
that could collect users’ viewing data in eleven million consumers’ 
televisions without their consent or knowledge. VIZIO TVs appended 
specific demographic information to the viewing data, such as sex, age, 
income, marital status, household size, education level, home ownership, 
and home value; the company then sold the viewing and demographic 
information to third parties.317 
                                                   
312. See J&J Warns Diabetic Patients: Insulin Pump Vulnerable to Hacking, REUTERS (Oct. 4, 2016), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-johnson-johnson-cyber-insulin-pumps-e/exclusive-jj-warns-patients-of-
insulin-pump-cyber-bug-low-hacking-risk-idUSKCN12411L [https://perma.cc/KR47-D9NR]. 
313. See Scott J. Shackelford et al., When Toasters Attack: A Polycentric Approach to Enhancing 
the “Security of Things,” 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 415, 436 (2017); Lily H. Newman, Medical 
Devices Are the Next Security Nightmare, WIRED (Mar. 2, 2017), https://www.wired.com/2017/03/
medical-devices-next-security-nightmare/ [https://perma.cc/6P29-7XPJ]. 
314. See Nicholas Shields, The FDA Has Recalled About 500,000 Internet-Connected 
Pacemakers Over Hacking Fears, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 1, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/fd
a-recalls-500000-internet-pacemakers-hacking-fears-2017-9 [https://perma.cc/QL48-FFL5]. 
315. See FTC, supra note 304, at ii. 
316. See Andrew G. Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 1109 (2017) 
(discussing the emerging use of predictive policing). 
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Perhaps the most notorious recent IoT incident involved a Portland, 
Oregon couple who discovered that their Amazon Alexa device had 
somehow recorded a domestic conversation and then silently emailed the 
recording to an acquaintance.318 Amazon described the incident as the 
result of multiple misheard commands, suggesting it was a rare and 
unusual event,319 but it serves well as a proof of concept for how an IoT 
device can be listening in the home and quietly sending audio to anyone. 
We probably have only just begun to imagine the ways in which hacked 
IoT devices can harm users. Already, domestic-abuse victims have 
reported that former partners used remotely controlled devices to change 
electronic locks, ring the doorbell, change the behavior of thermostats or 
lights, set smart speakers to blare music, or spy on them via security 
cameras.320 In extreme cases, victims have been referred for involuntary 
psychiatric evaluation when they complained that their ex-partners were 
remotely controlling devices in their homes, or spying on them at all 
hours. “[Y]ou can start to look crazy,” said the director of a Silicon Valley 
domestic-violence program.321 
B. Threats from Connected Cars 
Connected cars have some ability to record, send, or receive 
information.322 How much varies with the vehicle and with time—newer 
cars tend to collect more information about the car’s usage and location, 
the driver’s behavior, and even non-automotive information such as a 
passenger’s synced cell-phone contacts or messages.323 
A connected car does not have to have any autonomous capabilities; 
conversely, autonomous vehicles almost certainly will require the ability 
                                                   
Users’ Consent (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2017/02/vizio-pay-
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TIMES (June 23, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/23/technology/smart-home-devices-
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Exception, 106 GEO. L.J. 181, 184 (2017). 
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“to collect, send, and receive different types of data, or will at least depend 
on some manner of mapped data (such as through GPS) for the vehicle to 
function autonomously, in addition to any connected features the car may 
have.”324 
 
Thus, the car of the future, and some of the cars of today also, will be 
able to store and report not just the vehicle’s location and speed, but also 
the passenger’s media habits, cell-phone calls, and even in-car 
conversations. Already today, connected-car systems come standard in 
many models; not only are they active whether or not the user chooses to 
use them but even a determined hobbyist willing to void the warranty may 
find them hard to disable.325 Connected cars can also be very invasive. 
While yesterday’s drivers could reasonably think of their in-car time as a 
private moment, today’s BMWs come with Alexa built-in,326 and perhaps 
listening in as well.327 Other cars may soon have sensors capable of voice 
or facial recognition of all passengers, allowing tailoring of the driving 
experience to their preferences and health monitoring of drivers, but also 
collection of yet more information about the car’s use.328 Manufacturers 
may include an off switch—the VW Golf has a little-known switch only 
accessible to dealers that can turn off data sharing329—but no U.S. law 
requires that the car makers do so.330 
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325. Shuko, How to kill CarNet (also, what’s inside the box and buttons.), GOLFMK7 (April 20, 
2015), https://www.golfmk7.com/forums/showthread.php?t=9618 [https://perma.cc/3CVR-HE7G] 
(“Just removing the antenna did not disable the communications. It [a VW Golf] was able to connect 
as if nothing was wrong, even after I tried shorting the leads together.”). 
326. Frederic Lardinois, BMW’s Alexa Integration Gets it Right, TECH CRUNCH (July 29, 2018), 
https://techcrunch.com/2018/07/29/bmws-alexa-integration-gets-it-right/ [https://perma.cc/733V-DRVE]. 
327. Erin Biba, How Connected Car Tech is Eroding Personal Privacy, BBC (Aug 9, 2016), 
http://www.bbc.com/autos/story/20160809-your-car-is-not-your-friend [https://perma.cc/F4FG-8WGZ]. 
328. Future of Privacy Forum, The Connected Car and Privacy: Navigating New Data Issues 8 
(Nov. 13, 2014), https://fpf.org/wp-content/uploads/FPF_Data-Collection-and-the-Connected-
Car_November2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/WLQ5-SUYE]. 
329. Biba, supra note 327. 
330. In 2014, U.S. automakers voluntarily subscribed to a set of “Consumer Privacy Protection 
Principles” promising transparency as to their monitoring activities. However, under these principles 
when a participating automaker provides adequate notice to the consumer, the “Owner’s or Registered 
User’s acceptance and use of Vehicle Technologies and Services constitutes consent to the associated 
information practices.” In other words, the consumer need give no further affirmative consent. The 
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information with third parties. ALLIANCE OF AUTO. MFRS., INC. & ASS’N OF GLOBAL AUTOMAKERS, 
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The connected car will mate the dangers of location tracking with the 
dangers of the IoT, making a person’s location more visible to attackers, 
and also putting the car at some risk of being hacked in ways that might 
endanger the passengers. In so doing, connected cars implicate the 
Typology’s intimate zone (special privacy), the semi-private zone (not 
only communications privacy but also associational privacy, in that the 
car will allow third parties to use location mapping to reveal associations), 
and the public zone (in that its tracking powers effect behavioral privacy). 
C. Threats from Oversharing 
Lack of privacy—usually self-inflicted via social-media posts—has 
created new dangers for social media users. Instagram posts can reveal 
details about the home and about children. Twitter routinely geo-tags 
posts made from cell phones, revealing the poster’s location. 
Consider the threat that social media posts can pose to travelers. 
“‘Instead of looking for physical signs that a home is unoccupied, burglars 
can simply scan Instagram posts, monitor Twitter feeds and check 
Facebook for signs that someone isn’t home.’”331 Posted photos showing 
off prized items within one’s home can become personalized treasure 
maps for burglars. 
Posting the wrong picture may also obviate the need for would-be 
intruders to break in. A photo clearly depicting a house or car key can 
provide sufficient detail for an intruder to make a usable copy of the 
key,332 leading one commentator to call on journalists to “Stop Posting 
Photos of Real Keys in News Stories.”333 A similar problem arises when 
news or other photos taken in offices or homes reveal passwords on 
strategically placed post-its. Notoriously, a photo of the Hawaii 
Emergency Management Agency—taken shortly after the false missile 
alert that briefly terrified residents of that State—revealed a password for 
accessing the alert system.334 
Although oversharing implicates privacy interests in arguably all four 
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zones, it differs from our two other examples in key respects. First, 
oversharing is something that people do to themselves. Second, the 
communication, if not necessarily all the meta-data that gets associated 
with it, is voluntary and is constitutionally protected speech on the part of 
the social media user. As a result, even if some uses of social media may 
put the user in danger, the scope for regulation is very limited, and may 
not extend beyond user education campaigns and transparency rules 
requiring social media platforms to disclose what sort of invisible 
information they may collect or disclose. 
CONCLUSION 
As we stated at the outset, privacy is not a one-way street. We do not 
dispute that in many cases transparency—the absence of privacy—can 
enhance safety. Instead, we have sought to demonstrate that privacy too 
can enhance various types of safety, and that indeed current law and social 
institutions frequently recognize and cater to this reality. 
As our survey in Part III shows, how and when privacy is safety varies 
with the circumstances. Some privacy protections, especially those that 
protect against physical dangers, are direct, but many are mixed in with 
larger social goals. We protect informants and whistleblowers for reasons 
much the same as we protect penitents and political organizers: in each 
case, we think that by making people safe we not only protect the 
individual but serve a broader social policy. 
In both law and philosophy, claims to privacy require justification. 
Some classic justifications are based on first principles, claiming that 
privacy is itself a fundamental human right. For example, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, and many other international and regional treaties 
recognize privacy as fundamental.335 
But justifications can also rely on instrumental claims that privacy 
furthers worthy goals, which themselves trace their provenance to 
something fundamental. Instrumental claims for privacy come in many 
forms, ranging from Richard Posner’s claim that privacy is no more than 
an intermediate good (and thus, actually, quite often a bad) to empirical 
claims that privacy is an essential component of human flourishing and 
self-determination because it creates a zone of mental or physical 
independence necessary to allow experimentation and self-realization. In 
between these extremes lie practical accommodations—many of which 
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we may take for granted. Not surprisingly, though, instrumental 
justifications always relate to a person’s interactions with social practices. 
In general, these instrumental arguments are subject to two types of 
counterarguments. First, they can be rebutted by countervailing 
instrumental arguments: each claimed good effect can be offset by a 
claimed equal or larger harmful effect. Second, if rights are trumps,336 then 
instrumental claims may be vulnerable to pure rights-based claims, 
although the extent to which that is convincing may depend on how 
central the specific instrumental claim is to the realization of the 
underlying right or rights that it serves, enhances, or enables. 
Despite our recognition of these potential rebuttals, we have focused 
here on instrumental cases for understanding privacy as safety because 
those are the ones most likely to persuade U.S. administrative agencies to 
regulate with any eye toward protecting privacy as part of their variegated 
missions to protect people against various risks.337 If the United States had 
a general privacy policy akin to the GDPR, then such arguments would be 
unnecessary because U.S. agencies would have a broad freestanding 
obligation to consider privacy for its own sake rather than privacy as 
something else. Yet even without such a general mandate, U.S. law 
contains many provisions designed to enhance and protect public safety. 
If privacy is safety, even only in part, then U.S. law may turn out to be 
more protective of privacy than any of us suspected.338 
Nevertheless, there are still areas where regulation could increase 
safety by increasing privacy. If privacy has instrumental value because it 
protects safety, for instance, if it is safety, then when new technologies 
undermine privacy in ways that threaten safety directly or indirectly, 
agencies with safety mandates will have the duty, or the discretion, to 
intervene. And even where regulation might be inappropriate or difficult, 
as with the case of oversharing, we would benefit from a better 
understanding of the ways in which the absence of privacy causes an 
absence of safety. 
By showing that privacy, in several of its varied forms, enhances safety, 
we have tried to underline how privacy has far broader safety effects than 
is commonly recognized. We hope this will spur greater respect for the 
instrumental value of privacy, more privacy protections in the United 
States, and in turn more safety. 
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